World Day Against Child Labour

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The worst thief is he who steals the playtime of children! - Big Bill Haywood

Today marks the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the landmark ILO Convention No. 182, which addresses the need for action to tackle the worst forms of child labour.

Of an estimated 218 million child labourers, about 100 million are girls. Exposed to danger in hazardous labouring are an estimated 58 million girls.

Yet yesterday, today, and tomorrow, the plight of these millions of abused children is unlikely to be on the front page of your local commercial newspaper nor the lead story on your television news channel.

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Sri Lanka

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Sri Lanka needs to be looked at now. I'd been working (slowly) on the next post in the alphabetic sequence I've taken so far, but I received this call to action from my friends at Avaaz and it has to be shared:

Dear friends,

A modern day bloodbath is unfolding on the small island of Sri Lanka and the key to stopping this humanitarian disaster lies with Sri Lanka’s largest donor and closest partner in the region -- Japan. Let´s send a powerful message to the Japanese Foreign Minister asking for pressure to stop the killing.

Now that the US has begun to increase its pressure, the solution to stopping this humanitarian disaster lies with Sri Lanka’s key donor and closest partner in the region -- Japan. It has powerful political and economic influence over the Sri Lankan government and a swing vote at the UN Security Council, which up until now has turned a blind eye to this mounting catastrophe.

Click here to send a message to the Japanese Foreign Minister, who is deciding his government's next steps. Japan cares about its international reputation and a flood of messages from abroad would encourage them to act. If Japan moves then the Sri Lankan government will be forced to immediately respond to protect civilians.

As last weekend´s carnage testifies, every minute counts for the estimated 50,000 civilians still trapped inside the shrinking conflict zone and for those 200,000 more who are barely surviving in overcrowded camps. The International Committee of the Red Cross, which rarely makes public comment, called this conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil rebels, 'nothing short of catastrophic'.

Until now, the divided UN Security Council has abdicated their responsibility to protect Sri Lankans from war crimes and other atrocities. But in this conflict Japan cannot be ignored – it's powerful voice could tip the balance and influence the conflict dynamics, saving lives in the short-term and promoting peace and development in the long run.

Asia's longest-running civil war is entering its final stage – the only question is how many will die before it ends. Let´s send a powerful message urging Foreign Minister Nakasone to act responsibly and lead international efforts to push the Tamil rebels to release the remaining civilians, stop the government bombing and bring sustainable peace to Sri Lanka. Japan's political and economic weight means that they cannot be ignored.

As other donor nations increase the pressure behind the scenes this week, a truly global citizens' outcry can further turn the heat on the Japanese government to use its leverage and push for a robust and concerted international action that stops the bloodshed and protect the Sri Lankan civilian population at risk. Thank you for sending your message today.

With hope

Luis, Brett, Alice, Graziela, Pascal, Ben, Ricken, Paula, Iain, Paul, Raj and the rest of the Avaaz Team


Update May 14, 2009:

The United Nations Security Council has asked the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tiger rebels to ensure the safety of civilians trapped in the conflict.

A UNSC statement expressed grave concern at the worsening humanitarian crisis in the northeast.

The International Red Cross report that their workers on the ground in Sri Lanka are "witnessing an unimaginable humanitarian catastrophe."

Update May 23, 2009:

According to some mainstream media outlets, the United Nations has stated that up to 10,000 civilians died in the Sri Lankan army's advance across the north of the island between January and May. In fact, the United Nations has not stated a casualty count at this stage. To properly assess the human cost of the Sri Lankan army's advance, the UN needs access to the suffering survivors. The Sri Lankan government has not, as yet, provided the necessary access.

orana gelar


See also: bloody venerable island on webdiary-libre
Google news on Sri Lanka
Wikimedia Atlas of Sri Lanka

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Ascension Island

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Almost invisible on a world map, the small island called Ascension seems to be reduced only to a fragment of land lost in the South-Atlantic Ocean and devoid of any interest. However it is strategically positioned in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.

Ascension has no indigenous population. It was first inhabited in 1815 when the British garrisoned it as a precaution after imprisoning Napoleon I on St Helena (1,287 km to the southeast). Now it is a British Overseas Territory which, together with St Helena and Tristan da Cunha, forms a single territorial grouping under the sovereignty of the British Crown.

Much of the island is a wasteland of lava flows and cinder cones. Then there's Wideawake Airfield, a joint facility of the Royal Air Force and the United States Air Force. Both the BBC and Cable & Wireless have communications posts there. The European Space Agency has a tracking station. There's also one of five ground antennas used in the operation of the Global Positioning System.

In his 1996 book Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network, investigative journalist Nicky Hager claimed that Ascension Island was the location for a station that represented a missing piece in the secretive ECHELON world-wide electronic spy network. [Another station in that network may be located within the British Sovereign Base Area of Dhekelia. One is certainly located in central Australia.]

Last year, at the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, British diplomats requested sovereignty over 200,000 km2 of submarine territory around the island. It's to enable British control of exploration into new reserves of oil, gas and minerals.

orana gelar


Wikimedia Atlas of Ascension Island
Ascension Island Web Cam

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Aruba

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There is a 33-kilometre long island in the southern Caribbean Sea. Caiquetios had been living on this most southwestern island of the Caribbean archipelago for 1,000 years or more, then came ships from Spain. The Conquistadors aboard those ships were seeking gold and other precious metals. They searched and found none, so the Spaniards declared Aruba one of the Islas Inutiles (Useless Islands).

But they put it to some use before long. They set about sending captured islanders to another larger Caribbean island they'd conquered. They sent the Caiquetios first as slaves to labour in their copper mines, then later they sent the Caiquetios to work on their cattle and horse farms.

In April 1624, Pieter Schouten, sailing with three ships for the WIC, had sighted Aruba off the Venezuelan coast. Also sighting men and horses on the shore, Schouten did not disembark. Three years later a WIC expedition under Dirck van Uytgeest sailed off the Aruban coast. They too spied men on the shore and stuck to the safety of their ships.

Then in 1633 Spain conquered the nearby island of Sualouiga (which Colombus had called Isla de San Martín). It was situated strategically between two of the colonies of the Netherlands -- Brazil and Nieuw-Nederland (on the northeastern coast of North America). The Dutch and the WIC couldn't tolerate this situation. They needed a stronghold in the Caribbean to ensure Dutch supremacy in the New World, so from Nieuw Amsterdam WIC ships sailed south and conquered the island called Curaçao (now part of the Nederlandse Antillen), using it as a base of operations during the Eighty Years' War to attack the Spanish armada.

After suffering the hardness and inhuman conditions of the trip from the other side of the Atlantic, the hundreds of thousands African slaves arriving to Curacao, were "refreshed" in the fields around Willemstad. After this they were taken to the slave market and sold like cattle.

Soon after the Dutch landed on Aruba, taking control of it to prevent attacks being launched from here upon Curaçao, which became both the administrative centre for the WIC and central in the Caribbean slave trade. On Aruba the WIC began engaging the locals in breeding horses and particularly goats on the island, so many that Aruba was also called the "goat island". For some years the main export of Aruba were these horses, worth about 300 guilders each, and goats. They were exported to Jamaica and Cuba. The WIC also had islanders cut down so-called Brasilwood, which was shipped to Amsterdam where it was rasped by convicts at the Rasphouse, the prison.

After acquiring land on Aruba from the WIC in 1773, Moses Salomo Levy Maduro sailed to Aruba and settled there with his wife and half dozen children. They were the first Europeans allowed by the WIC to settle on the island. Maduro came from a Portuguese Shepherdic Jewish family that was prominent in Curaçao where Jewish merchants were buying to on-sell sizeable numbers of slaves from the WIC depot.

Except for a short period when the island fell to the British during the Napoleonic Wars, Aruba has remained under Dutch control. Clearly, the Dutch have seen some usefulness in this so-called 'useless island'. And they've not been the only Westerners to do so.

With the discovery of gold on Aruba in 1800, mining became the island's foremost industry and its economy boomed. By 1916 the gold supply had mostly been tapped out, and as the gold mining industry waned, so did the economy.

In the 1920s an American-owned oil terminal was set up on the island to tranship and refine oil from the nearby Maracaibo basin. By the time when the world was at war for the second time, this terminal had become one of the largest Exxon oil refineries, producing 440,000 barrels of refined oil products per day. During World War II, the Curaçao and Aruban oil refineries were the main suppliers of refined products to the Allies.

For more than 50 years, the huge oil refinery was the island’s major income source, andit employed a a large part of the population. The Aruban economy, and thus the society, was transformed. The presence of the refinery financed schools, doctors, and houses. There was even a golf course built for employees. Aruba saw a wave of immigration as laborers came from around the Caribbean to work in the refinery. Then suddenly it closed. Unemployment increased dramatically.

Aruba then gambled on tourism as a possible solution to the economic situation. These days three quarters of Aruban GNP is earned through tourism and related activities. The cactus-strewn island, particularly popular with American tourists, is now known as the Las Vegas of the Caribbean.

orana gelar



Wikimedia Atlas of Aruba

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Earth Hour

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Armenia

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The country in the mountainous parts of the South Caucasus, between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, known to its people as Hayq (later Hayastan), is a land at a strategic location between two continents, the juncture of Eastern Europe and Western Asia. As is the way with such situations, the people inhabiting this strategic location often suffered foreign invasion, occupation and oppression. Despite periods of autonomy, over the centuries the Hai, the Armenians, came under the sway of various empires including the Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Persian, and Ottoman.

The contemporary Hayastani Hanrapetut῾yun (Republic of Armenia), the successor state to the Armyanskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika (Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic), occupies only some of the Armenian ancestral lands and only one-fifth of the world's Armenian population lives within this "Eastern Armenia". The other parts of "Greater Armenia" are now within Türkiye Cumhuriyeti (the Republic of Turkey), parts of Iran and Syria.



Armenians are one of the world's most dispersed peoples. Large Armenian Diaspora communities can be found in Russia, the United States, France, Iran, Georgia, Syria, Lebanon, Argentina, Ukraine, and Poland. Smaller communities exist elsewhere within countries on each of our world's habitable continents.

Can the human condition as experienced today by an Armenian be understood without first learning what causes so many of them to have left their homeland?

No, one can only genuinely comprehend the current human condition as experienced by Armenians after reflecting upon the Hamidian massacres carried out by Hamidiye Alaylari in the 1890s on the orders of the then ruler of the Devlet-i Âliye-yi Osmâniyye (Ottoman Empire) Abdü’l-Hamīd-i sânî, and more so, only after reflecting upon what Armenians call the Mec Ejer'n (Great Calamity) -- the fatal forced relocation and tremendous massacres of a great many Armenians during the regime of the Jön Türkler (Young Turks) from 1915 to 1917.

Debate over what happened to Armenians in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire remains acrimonious about a century later, and its ramifications are wide-reaching. Diplomatic relations between the governments of Armenia and Turkey remain frozen because of the dispute. Every Turkish government for almost a century now has passionately denied that a genocide took place. Armenia insists on a Turkish confession for 'genocide' and an apology.

Many people around the world see Turkish recognition of the Armenian genocide as a prerequisite for Turkey's admission into the European Union. Yet, the European Union has said Turkish acceptance of the Armenian genocide is not a condition for Turkey's entry into the bloc. In late 2007, President George W. Bush rebuffed a proposal before the United States Congress to pass a resolution formally recognising the genocide, for fear of jeopardising relations with Turkey, which is a key ally of the United States. Both Democrat presidential contenders, Hilary Clinton and Barack Obama committed to recognising the Armenian genocide if elected President.

However, as noted by Onnik Krikorian, a freelance photojournalist and writer from the United Kingdom based in Yerevan, on his Frontline blog campaign promises should always be taken with a pinch of salt. Previous US presidents have reneged on their own campaign promises to recognise the genocide, and although President Obama is expected to buck the trend, remains to be seen what Barack Obama decides.

The dispute about whether it was a 'genocide' centres on the question of pre-meditation, that is on the degree to which the killings were orchestrated. Scholarship on the issue is dominated by two strands, both perhaps too often presenting argument that is too simplistic. The over-simplified arguments given on each side are then taken up in nationalistic slanging matches between those who care little for scholarship.

One of these two strands of scholarship is Turkish nationalist, and it does not accept the word 'genocide' as an accurate description of the events. This strand tries to deny that 'genocide' occurred, and contends that most of the Armenians who died were killed as a direct result of their rebellion (seen by Turks as treacherous behaviour and therefore warranting the relocation program, an ethnic cleansing measure which is generally not denied by them). Some who deny the Armenian genocide go as far as claiming that the high Armenian death toll was due to civil war among the Armenians. The arguments put forth by the deniers suffer from over-simplification, too often downplaying, for example, the connection between official decisions to implement a 'deportation process' and its horrific effects on those human beings who were subsequently 'processed.'

The other strand comes primarily from Armenian diaspora scholars. They argue that a genocide did, in fact, occur. The arguments presented by this side of the debate are sometimes also over-simplified, being framed in ways that understate some important situational factors. Sometimes overlooked or understated are issues such as the late 19th century decline of the millet system in the "Sick Man of Europe, the perceived "threat to power" posed by the Hay Dat idea taking hold at a time of "awakening" Armenian nationalism, the roles of the Dashnak and the Huntchakians, and that of the Kamavor, Fedayi - their call to arms: "Freedom or Death!"

It is clear, at least to those who choose to look, that the Armenians suffered in the last decades of their domination by the Ottomans. Under Sultan Abdul Hamid there was no day that in any Armenian city or village, some people were not murdered. In 1890, Hamid II created a a body of Kurdish irregular cavalry known as the Hamidiye. He created it to "deal with the Armenians as he wished." What followed were large-scale and widespread massacres of the Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, from Sasun in August 1894 to Tokat in February and March 1897. These were the first near-genocidal series of atrocities committed against the Armenian population within the Ottoman Empire.

Armenians raised some self-defence. The Hay Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), founded in Tiflis (Tbilisi in modern day Georgia), organised in 1894 various efforts to help the people of Sasun defend themselves against Hamidian purges. The Armenians of Sassoun confronted the Ottoman army and their Kurdish irregulars, but succumbed to superior numbers. The Sultan's men then burned the cathedral of Urfa, in which three thousand Armenians had taken refuge.

By 1896, the Ottomans had turned their attention on the Armenians of Van. At the start of that year, in his report to his ambassador in Constantinople, the British Vice Consul Major Williams speaks of a large number of Armenian villages "which have been looted ... Generally speaking the situation is very bad; the Armenians are everywhere in a state bordering on panic, afraid lest the spring will bring still further disasters ... ." The report he wrote in February speaks of Kurds killing the Armenians and Turkish military commanders practically condoning these murders.

To restrain the Kurd Hamidiye, Armenians began to organise retaliatory surprise raids, some open combat actions. Some resorted to the tactics of terrorism, aiming to intimidate the perpetrators of terrible acts against their people and those who supported those acts. After a week of fighting, the Sultan sought assistance from Western powers to end the fighting, in exchange for the safety of the Armenians in Van. Following negotiation making clear that they were acting only in self-defense, the Armenians agreed to leave for Persia escorted by Ottoman troops. En route they were massacred. Before the month was over, hundreds of villages were destroyed and 20,000 Armenians in Van were killed.

The massacres of Sasun and Spaghank in May 1900, Diarbekir in November 1900, Mush and Sasun, again, in September 1901, and Bitlis and Van in January 1902, seem to have faded from collective memory outside of Armenian traditions where we have tended to overlook this series of massacres and concentrate on the events of 1915.

Regardless of his effort to eliminate the threat he perceived, power was soon taken from the Red Sultan. The revolution was not one launched by the Armenians, but rather by Jön Türkler (Young Turks). In July 1908 the political structure of Empire was forever changed. Within a year, the Armenian population, empowered by the Sultan's dismissal, began organising politically in support of the new government, which promised to place them on equal legal footing with their Muslim neighbours.

In 1909, a military revolt directed against the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress) had seized Istanbul. While the revolt lasted only ten days, it had precipitated a month long massacre of Armenians in the province of Adana. The forces loyal to the Sultan wrested control of the governnment out of the hands of the secularist Young Turks, and Abdul Hamid II had briefly recovered his dictatorial powers. According to one source, when news of a mutiny in Istanbul arrived in Adana, speculation circulated among the Muslim population of an imminent Armenian insurrection. Initially mobs attacked the Armenian quarter in Adana, killing a few thousand Armenians over the next two day. Then the violence against Armenians spread out into the wider district. The manner in which the massacres were carried out was eerily reminiscent of that of previous massacres. By the end of the month as many as 30,000 Armenians were reported killed.

The massacres inflicted by Turks and Kurds on Armenians in these years before the 1915 atrocities are recalled by Armenians as the "Great Massacres." Hundreds of thousands of Armenians were killed in pogroms which were executed to scare a population believed to be on the verge of seeking independence, back into submission. They were designed to strike a severe blow to Armenian efforts to organise politically. They occurred in peacetime, with none of the exigencies of war invoked as justification for the 1915 'deportation process' and its deathly consequences. They reflected, in effect, an almost totally one-sided war waged on the Armenians by the forces commanded by a man who feared the Armenians becoming increasingly confident, prosperous, independent, and, perhaps in time, ready to rise and fight to become free to govern themselves.

Then came the Great Calamity, inflicted upon the Armenians after Enver Pasha blamed Armenians for the defeat of his forces in the Battle of Sarykamysh. In 1914, there were just over 2 million Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire, the majority in the Armenian homelands (what is now eastern Anatolia). By 1918, no more than 100,000 were left in those lands, and over half a million refugees were scattered across the Middle East, South America, Europe and the Soviet Union.

I've no doubt there will be continuing debate about whether the Great Calamity was genocide or otherwise. It has become a question now closely connected to the issue of identity -- Armenian and Turkish.

The Turkish state tries hard to keep mention of 'Armenian Genocide' out of Turkish historiography; its founding myth denying not only a genocide of Armenians, but the very existence of non-Turks in Asia Minor. Identifying Armenian killings as genocide is considered an insult against Turkish identity, a crime under Article 301 of the Turkish penal code. It has prevented a normal dialogue in which the genocide question can be openly discussed.

orana gelar


News Archive for Armenia
Wikimedia Atlas of Armenia
Amnesty International: Human Rights in Armenia
HDI: 0.777 (Rank 2008: 83)


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Argentina

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Argentina has a long, troubled history of serious political, economic and social crises. The situation now seems to be stable in the world's eighth largest country --one that is rich in resources, has a well-educated workforce and is one of South America's largest economies. But stability it seems has not been the norm in this land. When the history of the place is examined, it has often fallen prey to repeated recessions, resurgence of radicalism, return of repressive regimes, and resistance to them. Has it now escaped the boom/bust cycle? Has its people reconciled with their past and with each other?

Along with numerous nomadic tribes people, two main indigenous groups existed in the land now known as Argentina before Europeans arrived. In the northwest, near Bolivia and the Andes, was a people known as the Diaguita, while further south and to the east were the Guarani.

Spanish navigator and explorer Juan Díaz de Solís arrived at the mouth of a river on the eastern coast in 1516. He named this estuary, formed by the combination of the Río Uruguay and the Rio Paraná, the Río de la Plata (the silver river). Magellan touched at the estuary four years later, but turned southwards to winter on the Patagonia's shores.

In 1527 both Sebastian Cabot and his rival Diego García Sailed into the estuary and up the Paraná and Paraguay. They formed a small settlement, Sancti Spiritus, at the junction of the Caraña and Coronda rivers near their confluence with the Paraná. Within two years it had been wiped out by indigenous warriors.

In 1536, Spaniards led by Pedro de Mendoza founded a small settlement. They called it Ciudad de Nuestra Señora Santa María del Buen Ayre (literally "City of Our Lady Saint Mary of the Fair Winds.") Attacks by the indigenous warriors and famine forced the settlers away, and in 1541 the site was abandoned. A second (and permanent) settlement was established in 1580 by Juan de Garay, who arrived by sailing down the Paraná River from Asunción (now the capital of Paraguay). The region was made part of the vice-royalty of Peru, administered at very long range from Lima.

It was not until two hundred years had passed, that Río de la Plata became a vice-royalty with Buenos Aires as the main port and administrative center. The Spaniards could not afford to ignore Buenos Aires by this time. The city was growing rapidly thanks to illegal trade financed by British interests. Goods were smuggled to Brazil and the Caribbean Islands. Spain worried about British and Portuguese expansion and sought to control trade and collect more taxes from the growing commerce.

In May 1810, following the example set by Spanish cities after the capture of King Ferdinand VII by the French under Napoleon, Buenos Aires held a cabildo abierto, an open town meeting. A junta was elected -- the Primera Junta. It deposed the viceroy and declared itself in authority. The driving force behind the 1810 revolutionary movement, a strong commercial bourgeoisie based in the port area, created the Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata (United Provinces of Río de la Plata).

In July 1816, a congress of provincial delegates in San Miguel de Tucumán signed a declaration of independence, after which Buenos Aires became a major force in the region. In reaction, caudillos(strongmen)from the surrounding provinces attempted to curb its power. The struggle for power between Buenos Aires, the hub of commercial activity for the country, and the provinces that provide the raw materials, continued through the late 1800s.

Conquista del desierto: Ethnic Cleansing

The only indigenous inhabitants of the area were nearly exterminated by the colonists in a series of 19th-century wars. In 1878/9 the remaining indigenous peoples were either killed or driven south into Patagonia in a campaign called the Conquista del desierto (Conquest of the desert).
The genocide was commanded by Alejo Julio Argentino Roca Paz, who proclaimed:

Our self-respect as a virile people obliges us to put down as soon as possible, by reason or by force, this handful of savages who destroy our wealth and prevent us from definitely occupying, in the name of law, progress and our own security, the richest and most fertile lands of the Republic.
At the end of 1878, Roca started the first wave to "clean" the area
between the Alsina trench and the Curú Leuvú (Río Negro) by continuous and systematic attacks to the aboriginals' settlements. In 1879, he began the second wave with 6,000 soldiers, armed with new breech-loading Remington rifles supplied by the United States.

From 1880 to 1930 Argentina became one of the ten wealthiest nations in the world. Having conquered and taken control of much of the land, the Argentine government encouraged the immigration of Europeans to populate the country outside the Buenos Aires region. Buenos Aires grew from 90,000 people in 1851 to 1.3 million in 1910. By then the city was being called the "Paris of South America."

Social conflicts have always been part of Argentina's history. Social conflict was particularly intense during the late 19th century as the gap between the wealthy classes and the poor widened.

When the Argentinian rural economy began to develop the fertile regions of the pampas were divided into vast estancias owned by no more than 300 families. Each estancia covered hundreds of thousands of acres. With wealth in so few hands, oligarchy was inevitable. Argentine's gilded few ensure that power remained within their own circle by means of an exclusive club, La Sociedad Rural Argentina, which had been founded in 1866.

Revolución and Repression

By the 1890s this situation has prompted sufficient outrage for opposition groups to be formed - the Unión Cívica Radical, formed in 1892 campaigning on behalf of all shades of political opinion against the corruption of the regime, and in 1895 a splinter group, the Partido Socialista was formed. In September 1889, a student protest meeting in Buenos Aires saw the rise of the Unión Cívica Radical. In July 1890 in the Buenos Aires Artillery Park, a group of civilians, led by Leandro N. Alem, Hipólito Yrigoyen, and Bartolomé Mitre, with some military support rose against the government.

The Revolución del Parque was intended as a means, according to its Manifesto, to "avoid the ruin of the country" by bringing down "a government that represents illegality and corruption." It met with swift repression on the part of the government forces. Lacking initiative and ammunition, the revolutionaries were defeated in a matter of days, but the image of the government had suffered. The success of the revolution was limited to the resignation of the then authoritarian President, Miguel Juárez Celman, who had been notorious for his corruption and abuse of power.

The Unión Cívica Radical took up arms again in 1905, but conservative forces dominated Argentina until 1916, when the UCR won control of the government. Sadly, little changed for the working classes. Most workers could barely afford to feed their families during this time, despite the tremendous affluence of the upper class. Workers who sought to improve their working conditions were suppressed. A violent army attack against striking metalworkers in 1919 came to be known as La Semana Trágica (The Tragic Week). 700 were killed and 4,000 injured.

With that tragic event was sown seeds of the vigilante Liga Patriótica Argentina (Argentine Patriotic League), a nationalist Catholic paramilitary group. The League received military training by members of the Argentine Armed Forces and worked hand-in-hand with the Bonaerense police forces in the repression of social movements. Composed by wealthy youth, and unimpeded by the government, it assaulted workers' neighbourhoods.

It quickly extended itself through-out Argentina, carrying out a xenophobic nationalist, anti-Communist and anti-Semitic program, attacking in particular Catalans, accused of being anarchists, and Jews, accused of being Bolsheviks. At its height in the early 1920s, the Liga Patriótica Argentina counted within its ranks as many as 300,000 members throughout the country. In 1922, it participated in the Patagonia Trágica in Río Gallegos, during which 1,500 workers on strike were killed.

Década Infame

The crash of 1929, and the subsequent slump in the export of Argentinian beef and wheat, gave the army an opportunity and it enlisted the Liga Patriótica Argentina in the 1930 military coup of General José Félix Benito Uriburu y Uriburu, ushering in the Década Infame (Infamous Decade) when Argentina would once again by ruled by the old conservative, military-landowner oligarchy.

The Década Infame was characterised by electoral fraud, persecution of the political opposition, and generalised government corruption. Most of the military leaders were inclined to fascism, admiring the various European dictators of the time for achieving "stablility" by totalitarian means. The exercised their power against the background of the Great Depression, which forced many farmers and other countryside workers to relocate to the outskirts of the larger cities, resulting in the creation of the first villas miseria (shanty towns) in Argentina.

In early June 1943, the nationalist faction of the army, gathered around the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos and in a yet another coup overthrew President Ramón S. Castillo Barrionuevo in the midst of his unpopular attempt to impose Robustiano Patrón Costas as his successor. Composed under the initiative of the colonel Miguel A. Montes and Urbano de la Vega, the GOU included colonel Juan Domingo Perón.

The GOU established General Pedro Pablo Ramírez Machuca as chief of state. He was the founder and leader of the Guardia Nacional, an Argentine Fascist militia. Appointed to work as assistant to Ramírez's Vice President and Secretary of War, General Edelmiro Farrell, was a GOU member even the most casual observer of Argentina will know - Colonel Juan Domingo Perón.

Perón: Champion of descamisados or dictator?

In February 1944, Ramírez named Farrell president. By July 1945, Farrell announced presidential elections and his then Vice President, Juan Perón, was elected.

Under the rule of Ramírez and Farrell, Argentina had undergone an industrial expansion. This expansion was accelerated by World War II and led to the formation of a large blue-collar workforce. Perón had spent a year (1938-9) on secondment to the Italian army and had observed at first hand the methods of Benito Mussolini. In 1943 the workers of Argentina came under the direction of Perón as the military head of the Labour Department. He used his new constituency to build a power base that enabled him to be elected president.

Perón's ideology was an unusual blend of populism, authoritarianism, industrialism, and nationalism. Perónist rhetoric stressed the rights of descamisados ( literally "shirtless" poor of Argentina), but Perón used some of them to form gangs of thugs, tools with which to secure his hold on the nation much as Benito Mussolini had used his Black Shirts. Then he set about making sweeping political, economic, and social changes, pushing industrialisation hard; announcing in 1947 the first five-year plan in which he'd nationalise the railways, the docks, the central bank, the telephone system (including the American owned telephone company, IT&T).

Foreign trade was also taken under government control. Perón's state bought from producers at an officially set price all the agriculture bound for export. It then sold that produce at the higher prices prevailing on world markets. The result was perceived loss on the part of the old landed interests associated with the La Sociedad Rural Argentina, and a profit to the state which Perón used to fund his programs.

After re-election in 1951, Perón became increasingly dictatorial and erratic; especially so after the death a year later of his wife, the famed Evita. Economic problems arose. With the reserves built over the war years had been used up in the nationalisation program, the prices for export commodities fell, trade surpluses vanished, the government's deficits grew larger and inflation took off. The economic hardship led to reversals in Perón's policy; moves that favoured the old oligarchy.

As 1954 drew to a close, Perón unveiled reforms more controversial to the normally conservative Argentine public, the legalisation of divorce and of prostitution. Perón also took measures to secularise the nation's institutions; measures accompanied by descamisado attacks on church property, and even on priests. The Roman Catholic Church, which had once supported Perón's government, was by now antagonistic toward the man they called "the Dictator." By June 1955, Perón had been excommunicated by Pope Pius XII.

In response, Perón called for a rally of support on the Plaza de Mayo. But Perón had also lost the leadership of a large part of the military. As he spoke to the gathering of thousands of people, Argentine Navy fighter jets flew overhead, straffing and bombing the crowd. 364 were killed, 800 more were injured. In retaliation, extremist Perónist groups attacked and burned several churches that night.

Revolucion Libertadora: Repression returns

By September 1955 units of the armed forces had begun a campaign in the Argentine provinces. The Revolucion Libertadora, led by General Eduardo Lonardi, General Pedro E. Aramburu and Admiral Isaac El Caballo Rojas, deposed Perón and established a provisional government. Perón slipped away to exile, eventually settling in Francoist Spain.

Aramburu assumed the Presidency of Argentina. Perónismo was prohibited under Decree 4161. All things Perónist or of the Partido Justicialista: including as much as the mere mention of Perón, as well as symbols, images, or party demonstrations were prohibited. Aramburu's regime, known to Perónists as la Fusiladora hunted down known Perónists, of which many were imprisoned; some murdered.

On 9 June 1956, a Perónist group tried to regain democracy, but they didn't succeed. That night Aramburu's military forces captured some of those who had participated in the insurrection, including the leader Juan José Valle. The army took them to a dump in the neighborhood of Josea León Suárez, where they were executed by firing-squad. This terrible event was documented by the Argentine investigative journalist Rodolfo Walsh in Operación Masacre.

A year later the Grupo Tacuara de la Juventud Nacionalista (Tacuara Group of Nationalist Youth) was formed out of young well-to-do Argentines brought up in military high-schools and religious schools. Inspired by Primo de Rivera, founder of the Spanish Falange, the Tacuara were strongly anti-Marxist, opposed what they named “liberal democracy,” and admired dictators such as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Numerous tacuaristas were the children of members of the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista (ALN) -- related to the Legión Cívica Argentina which was one of the groups that supported Aramburu's regime.

For the next 20 years, a succession of governments under the military's watchful eye attempted unsuccessfully to create a new political order. Perón in exile still had control over his movement and over the trade unions. He continued to exert considerable direct influence over Argentine politics. In 1958, the Juventud Perónista (JP) formed to restore Perón to power and create a form of national socialism. In the lead up to elections in 1958, Perón instructed his supporters to cast their ballots for the moderate Arturo Frondizi Ercoli. Frondizi won, becoming president in May 1958, but his term in office was marked by interference from the military, dominated in its upper echelons by men from Argentina's old agricultural elites.

Over the course of the late '50s the Grupo Tacuara de la Juventud Nacionalista evolved into the Movimiento Nacionalista Tacuara (MNT). When Karl Adolf Eichmann, the "the architect of the Holocaust," who had been working under a false identity in Buenos Aires since the early 1950s, was kidnapped by Mossad and Shabak agents and smuggled out of Argentina to face trial in Israel, tacuarista terrorised Argentine Jews, attacking Jewish theatres, synagogues, and students. After Eichmann was executed in 1962, the tacuarista engaged in yet another anti-Semitic rampage.

Frondizi's government ended in 1962 when, after a series of local elections were won by Perónist candidates, the military intervened yet again. José María Guido became de facto President, becoming the only civilian to take power in Argentina by military coup, but divisions among the military leaders kept the nation in a state of tension until mid-1964, when new elections were held. Dr. Arturo Umberto Illía of the rightist UCRP won the presidency.

Illía's first act as President was to eliminate all restrictions on the Perónist political parties, surprising and angering the military. In 1965, legislative elections once again took place, this time without any of the restrictions existing in 1963. The Perónists presented their own candidate lists, winning these elections. This led to another coup in June 1966, which the junta would call the Revolución Argentina. This in turn led to a series of military-appointed presidents and the implementation of neoliberal policies. While preceding military coups in Argentina had aimed at establishing temporary, transitional juntas, the Revolución Argentina aimed at establishing a new political and social order, opposed both to liberal democracy and Communism.

The first of the military men to take the presidency under the Revolución Argentina was Juan Carlos Onganía Carballo, who suspended political parties and supported a policy of Participacionismo -- whereby hand-picked representatives of various interest groups such as industry, labour, and agriculture, would form committees to advise the junta.

At the end of May 1969 there was a general strike in the city of Córdoba. Police repression escalated the strike into a civil uprising. Onganía decided to send the military to crush the uprising. The episode became known as the Cordobazo and influenced events in other parts of the country. Argentine activists discovered that they could find popular support for violent and revolutionary means to bring down Onganía's dictatorship. Argentines were being radicalised.

Response to repression: Radicalism rises

During his exile, Perón had supported left-wing Perónists, such as the JP, the Movimiento Peronista Montonero (MPM), Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR), Fuerzas Armadas Perónistas (FAP) and others; and he'd also supported right-wing Perónists such as the "Special Formations", and radicals such as the MNT and the Guardia de Hierro (Iron Guard).

Formed in 1970, the MPM had initiated a campaign to destabilise by force what they deemed a pro-American regime. They kidnapped and executed former Argentine president Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, retaliation for his involvement in the José León Suárez of June 1956. Then they continued to kidnap, financing their operations by collecting ransom for businessmen or executives.

FAR members were mostly from the Federación Juvenil Comunista of the Partido Comunista de la Argentina (PCA). Throughout 1969 they had burned 13 Minimax supermarkets in Buenos Aires.

The Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), was the military branch of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT). The ERP, led by Mario Roberto Santucho, adopted the foquista strategy of insurgency, engaging in targeted urban guerrilla warfare, assassinating and kidnapping government officials and foreign company executives. It soon established control over a third of the province of Tucumán,around the Famaillá Department and the Monteros mountains. It had won the support of some 2,500 sympathisers.

Eventually, Onganía was opposed by the other factions in the military, which felt that their influence would be diminished. In 1970, General Roberto Marcelo Levingston Laborda, self-appointed as de facto president, opened one of the darkest political chapters of Argentine history. Levingston had been a little- known intelligence officer stationed in Washington.

In 1971, continuing economic problems and increased terrorist activities caused General Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, the leader of the coup against Onganía, to seize power in a coup against Levingston.

Héctor José Cámpora Demaestre, nicknamed el Tío (the Uncle), was Perón's "personal delegate." A veto on Perón's participation in the 1973 election had been issued by the dictator General Alejandro Lanusse and to circumvent it Héctor Cámpora ran for president on a ticket with Vicente Solano Lima, from Argentina's Popular Conservative Party, as candidate for vice president. One of Cámpora's first presidential actions was a granting of amnesty to political prisoners who where jailed during the dictatorship prior to his assumption in May 1973. Two months later Raúl Alberto Lastiri was promoted to the presidency after Héctor Cámpora and Vicente Solano Lima resigned.

Lastiri lasted only three months in the presidency. Crucially, he had appointed as Ministro de la asistencia social his father-in-law, José López Rega, the creator of the paramilitary organisation Alianza Anticomunista Argentina, aka the death squad Triple A, and a member of former camicie nere Licio Gelli's Propaganda Due. Gelli, part of a committee along with Carlos Saúl Menem supporting Juan Perón, had provided an Alitalia plane to return Perón to Argentina in June 1973.

Perón returns

On the day of Perón's return, a crowd of about 3.5 million left-wing Perónists had gathered at the Ezeiza Airport in Buenos Aires to welcome him. Camouflaged snipers, including members of the Triple A, opened fire on the crowd at the airport and least 13 people were killed and 365 were injured. The Ezeiza massacre had been designed to remove Cámpora, a moderate of the left-wing, from power.

Perón, supporting the unions, the radicals led by Ricardo Balbín and the right-wing Perónist, denounced the "bearded immature idealists" of the Perónist left. The resignations of Cámpora and Lima paved the way for new elections, this time with Perón's participation as the Partido Justicialista nominee. Perón received 62% of the vote, returning him to the presidency for a third time. Perón appointed as Vice President his third wife, María Estela "Isabelita" Martínez de Perón. He also appointed José Ber Gelbard as Ministro de Economía.

Gelbard set about implementing a plan, El Pacto Social (The Social Pact), which basically called for a freeze in prices and salaries to enable economic progress. Gelbard also gave a boost to Argentine exports, unilaterally lifting the Cuban blockade and selling one billion dollars in goods to Cuba (including U.S.-branded, but Argentine manufactured cars).

In November 1973, Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen in the Senate criticised the reform of laws concerning workers' trade-unions, which aimed at tightening the control of the trade-union bureaucracy on the workers' movement. The Triple A targeted Yrigoyen with a car bomb and seriously injured him.

Proceso de Reorganización Nacional: Repression returns yet again

Less than a year after his election, Perón died and the government was left in the hands of his widow, Isabel Perón who assumed the office of President (becoming the first 'non-royal' female head of state and head of government in the Western world). José Ber Gelbard resigned.

Isabel Martínez de Perón signed a number of decrees empowering the military and the police to "annihilate" left-wing subversion. Latiri's far right-wing father-in-law, José López Rega, nominally the Minister of Social Welfare, became de facto prime minister setting the agenda over a broad swath of Martínez de Perón's policies. López Rega set out to secure power for himself, stacking the Secretaría de Informaciones de Estado (SIDE) with fascists who were loyal to him.

The Argentine military were soon authorised to "execute all military operations necessary for the effects of neutralising or annihilating the action of subversive elements acting in the Province of Tucumán." The ERP had shifted to a rural strategy designed to secure a large land area as a base of military operations against the Argentine state. It had taken root in Tucumán at the edge of the long-impoverished Andean highlands in the northwest corner of Argentina. So the army set out to crush the ERP in 1975, launching Operativo Independencia.

In Tucumán the Argentine military used the methods of the "counter-revolutionary warfare" developed by the French in Algeria. They used terrorism, kidnappings of desaparecidos (i.e. forced disappearances), and concentration camps where thousands of guerrilleros were tortured and assassinated. And López Rega's Alianza Anticomunista Argentina assisted in enforcing the repression against the Perónist left-wing. The CONADEP commission on human rights violations has proved the Triple A murdered 359 people in 1975. Its involvement in several hundred other homocides is suspected.

Mounting search-and-destroy missions in the mountains, the Argentine military had the ERP on the run. Montoneros, in an action supporting their ERP allies, planted a culvert bomb at the Tucumán air base in August 1975. The bomb destroyed an Air Force C-130 carrying 116 Argentine commandos. It did not turn the tide. The military soon discovered Santucho's hideout in the hills. They raided the ERP's urban headquarters in September.

In March 1976, Isabel Perón was deposed in another coup by the military, which in turn launched the Guerra Sucia (the Dirty War), whereby they commanded the illegal arrest, torture, killing or forced disappearance of thousands of people, primarily trade-unionists, students and activists. The junta, La Dictadura headed by General Jorge Rafael Videla Redondo, Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera (also a member of Propaganda Due) and Brigadier Orlando Ramón Agosti, organised the so-called Proceso de Reorganización Nacional.

Two weeks before the military coup d'état, vice-Admiral Luis María Mendía had gathered naval officers, and issued Massera's order to prepare the repression against so-called "subversive delinquents. Mendía, known as "The Christian," was later revealed as the architect of a scheme of vuelos de la muerte (death flights) whereby victims were first drugged into a stupor, hustled aboard planes or helicopters, stripped naked and pushed into the Río de la Plata or the Atlantic Ocean to drown. Death flights had been used by the French Paratroopers in 10th Parachute Division under Jacques Massu during the Battle of Algiers.

The AAA enjoyed strong backing from Videla. It carried out widespread atrocities, given free rein by his military dictatorship. "As many people as necessary must die in Argentina so that the country will again be secure", Videla had declared in 1975 in support of the death squads. In 1976, one of the generals predicted, "We are going to have to kill 50,000 people: 25,000 subversives, 20,000 sympathizers, and we will make 5,000 mistakes."

The United States government was willing to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Argentina, though transcripts show U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the US ambassador to Argentina in conflict over how the new regime should be treated. Kissinger, who had the upper hand, preferred the U.S. remaining friendly with Videla's regime based on anti-Communist interests. This was despite the human rights abuses committed by the junta.

About 340 secret detention centers operated throughout Argentina between 1976 and 1983. The military referred to them as 'Prisoner Assessment Centers'. They formed a separate and unofficial prison system that secretly functioned alongside the legal structure. According to the witnesses who testified before the National Commission on the Dissappeared (CONADEP), these centers were closely supervised by high-ranking military officials. Commanders of the Armed Forces, the police and the Gendarmería personally inspected the installations under their jurisdiction, interviewed prisoners and, in many cases, at one time or another, actively participated in torture sessions and mass executions. These Commanders were men like General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri (Commander of the 2nd Army Corps and later on the 3rd president appointed by the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional), General Arturo Jáuregui (Commander of the 2nd Army Corps after Galtieri), General Reynaldo Bignone (the 4th and last president appointed by the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional), General Antonio D. Bussi (governor of Tucumán province), General Ramón J. Camps (Commander of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police Headquarters), Admiral Massera (Commander of the Navy), General Luciano Benjamín Menéndez (Commander of the 3rd Army Corps), Gendarmería commander Agustín Feced (police chief), General Carlos Guillermo c. Suárez Mason (Commander of the 1st Army Corps), General Cristino Nicolaides (Commander of the 7th Corrientes Infantry Brigade), General Juan Bautista Sasiaiñ (Commander of the La Ribera secret detention center and later on the Head of the Federal Police).

To be taken to a secret detention center meant to disappear. The military government consistently denied the existence of such clandestine centers, and Argentine authorities repeatedly disclaimed any knowledge of the men and women imprisoned there. The victims were physically and mentally isolated from the rest of the world. As unregistered detainees, they had no official status. They no longer existed.

"Disappearance" of people was only one aspect of the repression in Argentina under the military junta. Every secret detention center was designed primarily as a torture center. The junta's intelligence units were after names and addresses of dissidents allegedly involved in subversive activities. In order to extract such information from the prisoners, each detention center had at least one fully functional torture room run by professional teams of torturers.

These torture rooms ordinarily contained an iron bed, a table, a tub or barrel filled with water, a battery-operated field telephone that generated electric currents (the faster the turning of the handle, the higher the voltage produced), and wires or electric prods of two different intensities: 125 volts (causing involuntary muscle movements and pain all over the body) and 220 volts (causing violent painful contractions, as though limbs are being torn off the body, inducing vomiting and leaving deep ulcerations in the flesh).

All the prisoners in the secret detention centers, regardless of their sex, age and physical condition, were taken to these torture rooms. Some were compelled to witness the torture of their relatives in these rooms. Many people died in these rooms, but some of the victims were released from the secret detention centers in the same fashion they arrived there. After being warned not to talk about what they had gone through, they were unexpectedly taken by car to a street corner and let off. The hood and the handcuffs were removed at the very last moment, and the victims were ordered to look the other way and remain absolutely still or they would be shot. The anonymity of their oppressors was kept to the end.

Whilst Videla allowed the junta's repression of its "enemies", he largely left economic policies in the hands of Minister José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, scion of one of Argentina's oldest cattle ranching families. Martínez de Hoz had been president of the Sociedad Rural, as had his father and grandfather before him. His first act in government in 1976 was to ban strikes and allow employers to fire at will. Naomi Klein, in her 2007 book, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, points out that declassified U.S. documents show that Henry Kissinger was told by William Rogers, the assistant secretary of state for Latin America, that "Martínez de Hoz is a good man," and that Kissenger was so impressed that he arranged to have a high profile meeting with Martínez de Hoz when he visited Washington "as a symbolic gesture." During the tenure of Martínez de Hoz, Argentine foreign debt increased fourfold. Disparities between the wealthy and workers became much more pronounced.

From 1977 to 1984, after the fight over the Falklands, the Argentine Armed Forces, exported counter-insurgency tactics, including the systemic use of torture, death squads and disappearances. Special force units, such as Batallón de Inteligencia 601, headed in 1979 by Colonel Jorge Alberto Muzzio, established covert military centers in Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. They began training the Nicaraguan Contras and carried out covert operations that the CIA could no longer manage under the Carter administration.

In early 1981, General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri Castelli visited the United States and was warmly received. The Reagan administration viewed Galtieri and his ilk as a bulwark against Communism. Videla relinquished power to Roberto Viola in March that year and by the end of the year Genral Galtieri had ousted General Viola, who was, as had been Videla, considered by figures in the U.S. to be too sympathetic to Communism because of the normal relations maintained between Argentina and the Soviet Union. The official explanation given for the ousting was Viola's alleged health problems.

Galtieri had retained direct control of the army. Four months later and with his popularity low, Galtieri ordered Argentine forces to take by force the lightly-defended Falkland Islands and South Georgia. Galtieri thought he could boost his power by playing off long-standing feelings of the Argentines towards the islands and diverting public attention from a devastating economic crisis and the chilling genocidal Guerra Sucia.

Pressures: Of public opinion and economic problems

Corruption, the failing economy, growing public awareness of crimes against humanity by the regime, and the military defeat in the Falklands eroded the public image of the regime. The last de facto president, Reynaldo Bignone, was forced to call elections. He lacked support within the Army itself and the steadily growing pressure of public opinion forced his hand.

In the elections held in 1983, Raúl Alfonsín, the UCR candidate, won the presidency. Persistent economic problems plagued his tenure in office. It was also plagued by the old conservative forces.

Army factions, notably the Carapintadas, attempted rebellion against Alfonsín's government. Argentine civilians rallied to the cause of the democratic government, but when defeated the Carapintadas only their leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico and Major Ernesto Barreiro, were put under arrest. The Carapintadas had managed to bring about the retirement of the then Army chief-of-staff, Hector Luis Rios Ereñú, and to press the Alfonsín government and its congress into dropping all charges against lower ranked military officers. The clause came to be known as La ley de la obediencia debida (The law of due obedience).

In early 1989, Raúl Alfonsín's administration struggled against high inflation, recession, and high foreign debt. Álvaro Alsogaray, Arturo Frondizi's former Ministro de Economía, had in 1983 founded a neo-liberal party -- the Unión del Centro Democrático (UCeDé). In 1989 he called for liberalisation of trade, the exchange rate and wages; for privatisations; and for payment of foreign debt. Alsogaray was among the well-connected who had massively shorted the peso ley argentino prior to its ruinous 1981 collapse. He was also an outspoken supporter of the bloody March 1976 coup.

In the 1989 presidential elections, Alsogaray and the UCeDé endorsed the Perónist Partido Justicialista candidate, Carlos Menem. Thereafter, Álvaro Alsogaray influenced Menem's economic policies as he was appointed Argentina's chief debt negotiator in Washington. Menem introduced sweeping economic reforms--from privatisation to pegging the local peso to the U.S. dollar. The Argentine economy improved, but only at the cost of considerable unemployment. He also granted pardons to the former dictators Videla, Massera, Leopoldo Galtieri and other leaders of the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional, as well as others convicted of crimes committed during the Guerra Sucia.

In 1995, Menem had the constitution altered to allow him to run again for the Presidency. Following a first term marked by some economic success and political stability, Menem was re-elected to a second four-year term, but toward the end of that term many Argentineans had grown tired of Menem and alleged corruption in his administration. In 1999, he attempted to change the constitution again to let him run for a third time, but he failed. Instead his Vice President, Eduardo Duhalde, prevailed in securing the Partido Justicialista nomination for the Presidential election. Then Duhalde was defeated.

In the 1999 elections, Fernando de la Rúa, the former mayor of Buenos Aires, was elected on the back of his reputation for efficiency. However, his government, a coalition between the UCR and the Frente por un País Solidario (Frepaso), faced an ongoing economic crisis and was hampered by continuous fights and rivalries between coalition partners and cabinet crises. It soon gained a reputation for inaction and a failure to tackle corruption.

Within a year a political scandal broke out. It was reported that SIDE, Argentina's intelligence service, had paid massive bribes to a number of senators to approve a controversial labor law and the then head of SIDE, Fernando de Santibañes, was a personal friend of De la Rúa. The head of the left-leaning Frepaso and Vice President in the coalition government, Carlos "Chacho" Alvarez, expressed his anger over what he saw as the administration's failure to take stronger action in the scandal and then resigned his office. Ten months into his four-year term, the coalition looked doomed and de la Rúa was already looking like a lame duck. Finally, Fernando de Santibanes resigned under pressure from the ruling Alliance coalition.

A deep recession foreshadowed economic collapse in 2001. This left more than half the population living in poverty and triggered unrest. The country struggled with record debt defaults and currency devaluation. In December 2001 there were riots. Fernando de la Rúa resigned the Presidency.

Adolfo Rodríguez Saá Páez Montero, Partido Justicialista politician and governor of San Luis was selected to take over. In his inaugural speech, he announced that Argentina would default on its foreign debt. He later announced that Argentina would extradite every former military officer who was requested by foreign courts to face charges for human rights abuses during the Guerra Sucia. He was in office just seven days. The Presidency went to Eduardo Alberto Duhalde.

Duhalde was meant to serve as President until the chaotic situation of the country could be controlled. That was meant to take mere months. It took many, but he did manage to stabilise the economic situation (though only after more than a half of the population was in poverty).

A republic of equals?

In May 2003, Néstor Carlos Kirchner Ostoić was elected President on promises including one of "returning to a republic of equals". Soon after, he surprised the world by standing down powerful military and police officials and overturning amnesty laws for military officers accused of torture and assassinations during the Guerra Sucia. Kirchner, unlike his predecessors, had been schooled in Argentina (at La Plata National University in Buenos Aires, where he earned his law degree) and he began his political activism by opposing the brutal military dictatorship of Rafael Videla. Kirchner, twice arrested in the 1970s for his Peronist youth movement affiliation, backed the cause of justice for victims of the repressive military juntas.

Néstor Kirchner could see the Washington consensus was an unsuccessful model for economic development in the region. At his inauguration he strongly criticised the neo-liberal economic policies of his predecessors, blaming their slavish adherence to the IMF's rigid structural adjustment policies for the country's dire economic conditions. He also demanded that privatisation contracts for public utilities imposed on the country under the juntas be renegotiated, and declared it is the responsibility of the state to "introduce equality where the market excludes and abandons."

In other speeches against globalisation and the US plan for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Kirchner stressed the need for a “national capitalism” independent of any international influence. He kept the Duhalde administration's Minister of the Economy, Roberto Lavagna, who declared that his first priority was to solve the social problems caused by economic crisis. Prices of essential public services were frozen, and the planes trabajar (a sort of a dole payment to unemployed) was increased.

In a statement given to the United Nations in 2003, Kirchner said the following:

Encouraging collective progress and security in an intelligent way requires an understanding of the fact that the value of security is not only a military concept but one which stems from a preexisting political, economic, social and cultural scenario. Those are the central tasks for the main players on the international agenda.

In this framework, the relations of countries such as ours, and others, with the rest of the world are marked by a crushing, gigantic debt owed to both multilateral financial institutions as well as private creditors.

As a country, we recognize our responsibility for having adopted the policies of others, which led us to such heavy indebtedness. But we also urge the international financial institutions, which, in dictating such policies, contributed to, encouraged and favoured the growth of debt, to accept their own share of responsibility. It is almost a truism to point out that when a debt grows to such an extent, it is not only the debtor that is responsible, but also the creditor.

It is therefore necessary to acknowledge an actual, verifiable and, to a certain extent, common sense fact: the terrible difficulties involved in paying such a debt. Without concrete international assistance aimed at enabling indebted countries to rebuild their economic solvency and, consequently, their payment capacity, and without measures to promote their growth and sustainable development by taking concrete steps to promote their market access and the growth of their exports, debt repayment becomes an impossible dream.

Developing exports which add value to the natural resources that most indebted countries have can lay the foundations for the first steps towards sustainable development, without which creditors will have to face their losses without any other realistic options. No one is known to have succeeded in getting their money back from the dead.

In furtherance of this objective, i.e., of making a country viable in order for it to be able to pay its debts, it would be of great help to intensify multilateral negotiations for elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers hindering access of our exports to the markets of developed countries, which have larger purchasing capacity.

The fact is that in international trade in food products, for example, which is Argentina's main export item, export and production subsidies continue, as well as tariff quotas, unjustified phytosanitary measures and tariff ladders, which distort the terms of exchange for primary products and seriously hamper market access for products with higher added value.

The failure of the WTO negotiations at Cancun should serve as a reminder to us in this regard, and should be remedied by achieving the sort of link we are highlighting as desirable between new business opportunities in international trade, growth of indebted countries and their debt repayment capacity. It is a paradox, and almost ridiculous, that we should be expected to pay our debt while at the same time we are prevented from trading and selling our products.

On the other hand, although it is true that the objectives of multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund include "shortening the duration and lessening the degree of imbalance in the balance of payments of member countries", as well as to "instill confidence in them through resources in order to create the opportunity for correction without the need to resort to measures that are detrimental to national or international prosperity", it is also necessary to redesign institutions such as the IMF.

Redesigning multilateral lending agencies should include changing their paradigms, so that the success or failure of economic policies is measured in terms of success or failure in the fight for growth, equitable distribution, the fight against poverty and in ensuring adequate employment levels.

This new millennium should put an end to adjustment models in which the prosperity of some is based on the poverty of others. The dawn of the 21st century should signal the end of an age and the beginning of a new cooperation between creditors and debtors.


Then in early 2004, Kirchner threw the G-7 nations, the leading capitalist countries, into a quandary with his declaration that private investors who bought about $50 billion in government bonds in Argentina in the 1990s would receive only 25% of the face value of their bonds. Kirchner argued that the bondholders had gambled on Argentina during the heady days of the corrupt, neo-liberal government of Carlos Menem. The bondholders who had cared little about what the exorbitant rates on those bonds meant for the Argentine people would reap the results of their speculative adventures (which had fuelled the boom and bust of the Argentine economy).

The IMF, the World Bank and other international financial institutions lent new funds to Argentina in hopes of keeping it from opting out of the international financial system. Then these institutions attempted to turn the screws, insisting that Kirchner must "be more flexible" in debt renegotiations with the private bondholders.

During his presidency, Kirchner also shifted Argentine foreign policy from the "automatic alignment" with the United States during the 1990s, to one stressing stronger ties (economic and political) within Mercosur and other Latin American countries. He forged a close relationship with Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, a friendship through which the Argentine president secured energy deals in return for Venezuela’s purchase of government bonds. This was certainly frowned upon in Washington. Confronting strong criticism because of his relationship with Chávez, Néstor Kirchner always affirmed that strictly economic interest, rather than ideological affinity, motivated the strategic alliance with Venezuela.

Today, Cristina Elizabeth Fernández de Kirchner, current head of the Partido Justicialista and wife of past President Néstor Kirchner, is the Argentine President. She achieved a convincing win in the presidential elections. With 45% of the primary vote, she garnered almost twice as many electoral votes as second-placed Elisa Carrió. This obviated the need for a run-off ballot.

Early into her presidency, a United States assistant attorney accused her of obtaining illegal campaign contributions. By January this year, the U.S. had backed down, with its ambassador in Argentina clarifying that the allegations "were never made by the United States government." That hasn't precluded numerous websites maintained by rightwing individuals and groups, particularly Americans, from continuing to publish material that makes out that the allegations have been proved true.

Why has she been targeted this way? Christina Fernández Kirchner takes her bearings from her husband's interventionist economic model. She also adheres to her husband’s foreign policy, preserving close ties with Venezuela. Since Chavez took office in February 1999, America’s dominant media have relentlessly attacked him because of the example he represents and threat it might spread. [More on this later when we look at Venzuela.]

In March, Christina Fernández's government then introduced a new sliding-scale taxation system for agricultural exports. The aim was to raise government funds for social investment by increasing the government's share of returns from rising world grain prices, and also to reduce domestic food prices by encouraging farmers to switch to growing staple foods like wheat and corn, rather than export crops such as soybeans. The reaction was a nationwide lockout by farming associations.

On 25 March thousands of demonstrators massed around the obelisk in the capital and in front of the presidential palace. Protests extended across the country. Rather than resort to repression as the military juntas would have done, Fernández's government organised a rally on 1 April, in which thousands of pro-government protesters marched through downtown Buenos Aires in support of her leadership. She then famously called on farmers to act "as part of a country, not as owners of a country". Within a couple of days the farming associations has suspended their strike. They were back to blockading the roads by May.

In Argentina, history tends to repeat itself. The crisis in 2008 was, in large measure, a continuation of a centuries long running struggle between the few hundred families of the landed aristocratic oligarchs who hold the vast estancias and the majority population, much of which is poor. The ruralistas consider themselves to be the owners of the natural rent that cultivation generates in Argentina, and they have clashed with all administrations that have attempted to balance out the redistribution of this income.

And all throughout the history of this place the indigenous people suffer still, just as they had during the conquista del desierto. Guaraní communities have an average life expectancy of 40 years, and the greatest number of deaths is among their children. Guaraní children living in the subtropical rainforests of Argentina's northeastern province of Misiones are dying from preventable illnesses. Having been forced to abandon their territories and crowded into the most miserable quarters of the cities, they have no access to the plant species from which they made their medicine. They lost their environment, and that caused their health system to collapse.

At the beginning of November of 2006, the National Congress of Argentina approved Law 26.160 declaring a state of "emergency with respect to the possession and property of the ancestral lands of the indigenous communities of the country." Only four months after its adoption this law, one which prohibited for a period of four years the eviction or removal of indigenous persons and indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands, was already dead letter. Members of the Diaguita indigenous community of the Tucumán Province were victims of an aggressive campaign of forced evictions and threats of removal from their ancestral lands. Argentine police, using tear gas and shooting rubber bullets at the indigenous women, children, and men, displaced a number of families from their homes, burned and destroyed the houses and other structures.

Argentina remains far from a republic of equals.

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Antigua and Barbuda

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The people of this Caribbean nation populate two major islands – known today as Antigua and Barbuda – as well as a number of smaller islets.

The first major island was originally settled by peoples from Central or South America. They named the place Yarumaqui, which is believed to be derived from Yaruma, a plant from which canoes and rafts were made and Qui an island. Later it was known as Waladli, which means land of oil. Then, in 1493, the Italian explorer Cristoforo Colombo named the island Santa Maria de la Antigua (Old Saint Mary's) after a church in Seville, Spain. The early Spanish settlement in Antigua was made subject to English rule from 1632, with a French interlude in 1666.

The second island was originally known as Wa'omoni, island of large birds. This island, 48 km due north of Antigua, was leased to British brothers Christopher and John Codrington in 1685. On Barbuda the Codringtons produced food. They also transported slaves as labour for their sugar plantations on Antigua.

As on many other Caribbean islands during the centuries of colonial conquest, sugar cultivation had became the most profitable enterprise in Antigua and Barbuda. By the middle of the 18th century the island was dotted with more than 150 cane-processing windmills--each the focal point of a sizeable plantation. Due to the vast tracts of land needed for large-scale sugar production, rainforests on the islands were decimated.

Yet today, as in Anguilla, tourism accounts directly or indirectly for more than half of GDP and is also the principal earner of foreign exchange in Antigua and Barbuda. Until the development of tourism in the past few decades, Antiguans struggled for prosperity. And long gone are the rainforests, which would have been a drawcard to complement the beaches.

Instead the tourism is complemented by a global trade in guns and ganja, crack and other cocaine, a traffic that has put the island and its neighbours at a vital crossroads between the narcotics producers of South America and the eager consumers of the US and Europe. The drugs seep into the local population, payment in kind for dealers, or simply an impossible lure at prices that are a fraction of the street prices in the developed world, sometimes as low as US$1 for a rock of crack cocaine.

As in Anguilla, the place looks to be on the path to becoming a ganster's paradise. Gun crime and gang violence are on a sharp rise among Antigua's young. The murder rate per head of population in Antigua is more than three times higher than in New York. Nineteen murders were committed last year, three times Antigua's annual rate five years ago.

One of the main reasons for the escalation in violence, according to residents and police sources, is the enforced return of emigrant criminals. A report issued last year by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and Caribbean region of the World Bank reinforces the claim:

Each year, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada deport thousands of people convicted of various crimes to their countries of citizenship in the Caribbean. There is a widely held belief in the Caribbean that recent crime troubles can be tied directly to the activities of deportees who have learnt criminal behaviour in the developed countries."
The Antiguan Government says almost 300 have been returned to the island in the past 10 years. A few were from Britain, but most came from the United States. There are between 10 and 12 gangs on the island, fashioned after notorious gangs in North America. Antigua is in the midst of a "gang war", with groups of youths making U.S. urban gang names common currency. There's trouble in this paradise, too.

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Anguilla

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Anguilla, today a British overseas territory in the Caribbean, is located in the Caribbean Sea, the northern most island in the Leeward Island chain. It was a paradise, a lush island covered in dense rain forest, and it was first settled by peaceful tribes who slowly island hopped by raft or dugout canoe from the Orinoco region on the South American continent. They called the place Malliouhana, which meant arrow-shape sea serpent and they developed villages, farms and ceremonial sites to their gods.

In time the island was also "discovered" by Europeans. In 1493 the Italian explorer Cristoforo Colombo sailed by, but he never landed on the island. The French first visited it in 1564. According to tradition, Columbo gave the small, narrow island its current name because from a distance it resembled an eel (in Italian, anguilla). It is also possible that French navigator Pierre Laudonnière gave the island its name from the French anguille.

The first English settlers arrived from Saint Kitts - 70 miles to the southeast - in 1650. By this time the original people of the island had vanished, probably wiped out by disease, pirates, and the French. They found that the now uninhabited island's soil was good for growing corn and tobacco, so they established plantations. Thereafter, for the next 150 years or so, Anguilla, like other Caribbean islands, was caught in a power struggle between the English and the French, both nations seeking to gain control of the area and its highly profitable trade routes and cash crops.

The English triumphed in retaining control of the island and Anguilla was administered by Great Britain until the early 19th century, when the island - against the wishes of the inhabitants - was incorporated into a single British dependency, along with Saint Kitts and Nevis.

In 1967, Britain sought to loosen its colonial ties by lumping Anguilla into an alignment with the islands of St. Kitts and Nevis, the nearest British dependencies. The intent was for the three islands to form a new Caribbean nation, the Associated State of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, with Britain continuing to hold the reins on foreign affairs and defense.

Anguillians wanted no part of the new state, which they viewed as subjugation to St. Kitts, their more powerful neighbour. Union with St. Kitts had done nothing for Anguilla's infrastructure; up to 1967 there were no paved roads, no industries, no electricity, no pipe-borne water, no telephones and no proper port facilities. Fed up with the third-class status that they anticipated in a St. Kitts-led federation, the Anguillians had armed themselves and revolted, forcing St. Kitts police off the island and blocking the runway to prevent a 'reinvasion' by Kittitian forces. This set in motion a complex and sometimes almost farcical chain of events in which Great Britain and St. Kitts never looked good, and which climaxed with a bloodless, unresisted British invasion of Anguilla in March 1969. The event was later dubbed the 'Bay of Piglets'.

The Anguillians made sure that the political and administrative solution adopted had their interests, for once, at heart. It took until 1980 before Anguilla got what it felt it needed: Britain agreed to drop the idea of an Anguillian union with St Kitts and continued British administration of the island under a modified colonial status that granted Anguilla a heightened degree of home rule.

Anguilla's now thin arid soil is largely unsuitable for agriculture, and the island has few land-based natural resources. It's been said that cocaine importation and sale is a major industry in Anguilla, second only to luxury tourism. Apparently, the first thing that up to fifty percent of all tourists do when they finish checking into their luxury accommodation, is to go to the head barman or concierge and enquire where they can get cocaine (which at US$17.50 a gram is as cheap as chips).

Rich Americans and Europeans are buying up land across the island, purchasing entire beachfronts and restricting the property to trespassers. All over the island, real estate prices are soaring as investors offer millions for modest beach houses, which they plan to tear down and rebuild as mansions. Anguillans, mostly the elderly who don’t know the long-range ramifications, are selling off their land at an alarming rate.

The majority of the contemporary Anguillian population of 14,000 are the descendants of slaves transported from Africa. About ten percent of Anguillans live in the capital, The Valley, and the population on average across the island is very young; more than one third are under the age of fifteen. The future of Anguilla lies heavily in the hands of the younger generation, yet gang culture is emerging; drug and gang related crime is on the rise. From being virtually crime free before the turn of the century, Anguilla has become a place with a growing rate of serious and unsolved crimes including murders, rapes, robberies and kidnapping. There's trouble in paradise.
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Andorra

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If you are keen on a long life, one could assume that you should live as people do in the Principat d'Andorra. With a surface of 468 square kilometers (181 square miles) it is a small place; just three narrow valleys in the Pyrenees shaped like a "Y" and wedged between France in the north and Spain to the south. It has a population of only 71,800 inhabitants (July 2007 estimation), and only approximately one third are actually Andorran nationals. Current statistics show the average Andorran life span is an outstanding 83.82 years.

The interesting thing about the Andorrans is that they seem to make their living playing host to tourists with a taste for a commodity sure to shorten their lifespan -- cheap tobacco.

[Probably no more to come ... as Andorra seems to be "newsworthy" on the Internet's millions of English language websites only when playing football or enjoying a good ski season.]

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Angola

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Angola shares the same motto as Andorra - Virtus Unita Fortior, a Latin phrase meaning "Virtue united is stronger." However, the Andorrans appear to live peaceably together, with their neighbours and visiting foreign guests (all in accordance with that motto), and thus they enjoy an average lifespan of 83 years or so; whereas the average Angolan can expect to live a meagre 41 years. Let's try to understand why.

Located in south-central Africa, Angola (officially Republika ya Ngola), is the second-largest petroleum and diamond producer in sub-Saharan Africa today. The economy of Angola is, encouragingly, the fastest growing in Africa. Yet its people (Ovimbundu, Bakongo, Chokwe, Ganguela, Nhaneca-Humbe, Ambo, Herero, Xindunga and mestiços) are among the continent's poorest people.

The people of this country have endured 500 years of Portuguese colonisation, 14 years of the Guerra Colonial / Guerra de Libertação, a subsequent long running civil war and the effects of the Cold War between the United States of America and the (since dissolved) Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik.

When Portuguese mariner Diogo Cão landed at the mouth of the Congo River in 1483, two distinct African Kingdoms ruled the region. The Kingdom of the Bakongo reigned in the north. The Ovimbundos Kingdom, also known as Ndongo, dominated in the western and central areas. The land of the Ovimbundos was called "Ngola".

Portuguese colonisers – a hundred families and four hundred soldiers – arrived in Ngola in 1575. Their leader, Paulo Dias de Novais (grandson of Bartolomeu Dias) had his eye on the silver mines of Cambambe. However, the Portuguese were to set about trade in men, not metal. To put sugar in their pantries they had inhabited the islands of São Tomé and Santo Antão (Príncipe) and sought slaves to work on plantations they'd established there. So they launched the Kwata! Kwata! (To Catch! To Catch!), using other Africans to raid, to capture and forceably remove the Mbundu and BaKongo.

Their brisk trade in slaves brought more colonists and the Portuguese settlements around Luanda grew rapidly. Luanda became the greatest slaving port in Africa. By the end of the 16th century an annual average of 5,000 to 10,000 slaves were leaving Luanda for Brazil.

Portuguese rule in Angola was deeply racist. The Portuguese who immigrated to Angola were frequently deserters, degredados, peasants, and others who had been unable to succeed in Portugal or elsewhere in the Portuguese-speaking world. Enslaved Africans were branded with irons, as if they were animals. Besides exporting them, Europeans in Angola kept slaves as porters, soldiers, agricultural laborers, and as workers at jobs that the Portuguese considered too menial to do themselves.

Whilst slaves were used first on the engenhos (sugar plantations) on the nearby Portuguese-claimed islands, the Portugeuse would soon see a need to export and exploit Angloan people elsewhere. The supply of slaves to work the engenhos of Brazil would bleed Angola of its native population. Angolan territory was estimated to have 18 million inhabitants before the Portuguese came to colonise it. In 1850, only 8 million native people remained in their homeland (and there were just under 5 million in 1960). It is estimated that as many as 4 million Angolans were sold into slavery, most of them bound for Brazil. The slave trade severely weakened the cultural and economic integrity of the African tribes and caused resentment between people groups that lasts even to this day.

In time, the independence of Brazil from Portugal (in 1822) ended the export of enslaved Angolans to Brazil. In 1836, the shipping of slaves from Angola was banned, but slavery remained legal in the Portuguese empire until 1875. The Portuguese in Angola looked to make productive use of indigenato who could no longer be sold abroad as slaves. They began using concessional agreements, granting exclusive rights to private companies to exploit land, people, and all other resources within a given territory. Fazendas (farms) and engenhos were established to grow cash crops for export.

From the late 1870s through the early 1890s, Portugal renewed its expansion into the Angolan interior. The encroachment lead to continual outbreaks of warfare with the local rulers of the Kongo, Mbundu and Ovambo peoples. Instead of "slavery," the Portuguese instituted “corrective work” for indigenato on the sugar, coffee and cotton plantations.

In 1884, on the initiative of Portugal, the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, called on representatives of Austria–Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden-Norway (in union at that time), the Ottoman Empire, and the United States to take part in the Kongokonferenz (the Berlin Conference of 1884). Although controlling the slave trade and promoting humanitarian idealism were promoted as the focus of the conference, the conference only passed empty resolutions about the ending of slave trade and providing for the welfare of Africa. In truth, the result of the Conference was a method of dividing the continent of Africa between the European powers.

Other, more powerful European states of the nineteenth century had explored central Africa, so it was they, not Portugal, and certainly not Angolans, who determined Angola's boundaries. The west coast territory Portugal acquired included the left bank of the Congo River and the Cabinda enclave. Britain forced Portugal to withdraw from Nyasaland (present-day Malawi) and Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe and Zambia).

In 1899, Henrique Mitchell de Paiva Cabral Couceiro published a volume in which he advocated white colonisation, decentralisation of administration from Lisbon, and the necessity of inculcating in the Africans the "habit of work." As governor general of Angola between 1907 and 1910, Couceiro prepared the basis of civil administration in the colony. Military officers were to oversee administrative divisions, and through them "European civilisation was to be brought to the Africans."

The alleged justification for Portuguese colonisation in Africa had long been "to bring civilisation" to Africans. Yet during the first four and a half centuries of Angolan colonisation, the Portuguese had treated the Africans as little more than a resource of unpaid labour. Prior to the second half of the nineteenth century, most of the battles between Portuguese and Africans revolved around the slave trade. Following the Berlin Conference Portuguese attacks were principally motivated by desires for territorial conquest and the subjugation of the African peoples.

Portuguese attacks and African counterattacks in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries — euphemistically called the 'wars of pacification' — began in the south against the Ovambo, who battled for more than a quarter of a century. The wars spread to the Bie Plateau in 1902, when the normally pacific Ovimbundu revolted against labour conditions, the rum trade, and Portuguese interruption of the rubber trade. The Portuguese then attacked the Dembos in the north, sparking a conflict that continued until 1920. One by one the local polities were overwhelmed and abolished.

In 1912 diamonds were discovered in Angola. Five years later a consortium of Belgian, British, and Portuguese investors created the Companhia de Diamantes de Angola (Diamang) and monopolised diamond mining in Angola. Diamond mining started in earnest in the 1920s. Portuguese control over Angola tightened.

In 1921 the colonial administration divided the Angolan civil service into European and African branches and assigned mestiços and a few African assimilados to the latter, thereby limiting their chances of rising in the colonial bureaucracy. By 1929, the Portuguese had enacted statutes limiting the bureaucratic level to which mestiços and assimilados could rise to that of first clerk.

At this point we must look at a little Portuguese history. For in 1926 a military coup led to the establishment of a one party state in Portugal.

General Antonio Carmona ceased the role of prime minister. By 1928 he was "elected" president for life and instituted Ditadura Nacional. In 1932 Carmona passed his power to Salazar, António de Oliveira Salazar, who had worked as his minister of finance and then as also as prime minister. A year later Salazar introduced a new constitution. It gave him wide powers, establishing an anti-parliamentarian and authoritarian, almost fascist government and corporatist state.

In terms of colonial economic policy this meant an attempt to maximise wealth extraction, coupled with autarchic trading policies which made the colonies captive markets for Portuguese goods. Foreign investment in the colonies was generally discouraged; commercial opportunities were to be exploited by Portuguese alone. Along with this went compulsory production in the colonies of the raw materials needed to feed the industries of Portugal. Compulsory crop cultivation was supplemented by forced labour and higher taxation levels.

Portugal's policies toward Angola in the 1930s and 1940s were based on the principle of national integration. Economically, socially, and politically, Angola was to become an integral part of the Portuguese nation. Salazar's settlement policies contributed to the spread of anti-colonial resentment in Angola, especially after 1945. His policies resulted in increased competition for employment and growing racial friction. In 1951 the Portuguese dictator changed the status of Portugal’s colonies to overseas provinces in his Estado Novo (New State).

The authoritarian Salazar regime frequently used African informants to ferret out signs of political dissidence. Censorship, border control, police action, and control of education all retarded the development of African leadership. Angolans studying in Portugal -- and therefore exposed to "progressive" ideas -- were sometimes prevented from returning home. Political offences brought severe penalties, and the colonial administration viewed African organisations with extreme prejudice.

Yet the Africans of Angola did form organisations to resist Portuguese colonial rule. Forms of anti-colonial protest did arise in Angola in the late 1940s. In Luanda, mestiços and assimilados began cultural protests calling for Angolan identity and self-determination. The Movimento dos Jovens Intelectuais (MJI) was formed in 1948 under the leadership of an Angolan poet, Viriato Clemente da Cruz. In 1950, Africans in Angola sent a letter to the United Nations calling for condemnation of Portugal and for Angola to be given protectorate status under United Nations supervision.

In 1953 Angolan nationalists founded the Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA), the first political party to advocate Angolan independence from Portugal. The Partido Comunista Angolano (PCA) was formed in October 1955 under the leadership of brothers, Mário Coelho Pinto de Andrade (a poet) and Joaquim Pinto de Andrade (a catholic priest).

In December 1956, the PCA merged with the PLUA to form the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). Viriato da Cruz, the President of the PCA, became its Secretary General and Dr António Agostinho Neto was its President. Other movements soon merged into the MPLA, such as the Movimento para a Independência Nacional de Angola (MINA), which was formed in 1958, and the Frente Democrático de Libertação de Angola (FDLA), which was initially set-up as a parallel structure to the MPLA with support from the government of Congo-Brazzaville.

In 1960, Portuguese police arrested (for the third time) the MPLA's President, Agostinho Neto. His patients and supporters marched for his release from Bengo to Catete. Portuguese soldiers fired upon them, killing 30 and wounding 200 in the Massacre of Icolo e Bengo.

In January 1961 Angolans in the region of Baixa de Cassanje, in Malanje, boycotted working on the cotton fields of Portuguese, British and German owned COTONANG. They demanded fair wages and better working conditions. The Portuguese military responded to this "rebellion" by bombing villages in the region (allegedly using napalm) killing several thousand Angolans.

Several Angolan nationalist organisations had set up training camps and attracted external military aid. So in the summer of 1961, the Unão das Populações de Angola (UPA), which had strong support among the Bakongo and some rural Mbundu, formed a force of about 5,000 untrained and poorly armed troops. MPLA guerrillas, members of the Exército Popular de Libertação de Angola (EPLA), went to Morocco and Tunisia to train with Algerian forces (which was then fighting for their own national independence).

Soon they had carved out control of some of the country creating what the Portugeuse called Zona Sublevada do Norte (the Rebel Zone of the North). Early on the morning of 4 February 1961, several hundred Africans armed with knives and clubs attacked the principal political prison in Luanda. None of the prisoners were freed, yet forty of the MPLA men died and a vicious cycle commenced. Seven Portuguese police had been killed and following the funerals of the policemen, whites shot dead a number of African bystanders.

Militant Angolans attacked a second prison on 10 February 1961. The Portuguese reaction was brutal. The colonial forces responded by raining napalm and defoliants in a 'scorched earth' assault on 'nationalist' villages. The human cost was enormous: up to 50,000 Africans died, and about 10 percent of Angola's African population fled to Zaire.

Within a month, an insurrection broke out across a wide swathe of northern Angola. The UPA took advantage of the uprising and with its force of 5,000 took farms, government outposts, and trading centers. They killed everyone they encountered, whites, mestiços and blacks, particularly farm labouring Ovimbundu. Commenting on the insurrection, the UPA leader Holden Álvaro Roberto said, "This time the slaves did not cower. They massacred everything."

A month later, on 25 April 1961, Roberto, who had been inspired to begin his political career after witnessing Portuguese officials abusing an old man, shook the hand of John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America. The U.S. government began aiding the UPA. In June 1961, the UPA formally established an armed wing, the Exército de Libertação de Angola (ELNA).

Portuguese reinforcements began to arrive at the beginning of May 1961. The Portuguese retaliation was fierce and indiscriminate. Aircraft bombed and strafed villages in and outside the affected area, while troops and settler militias conducted a terror campaign on the ground. The Portugeuse unleashed their Batalhões de Caçadores Pára-quedistas (Paratrooper Hunter Battalions) and Caçadores Especiais (Special Hunters). Six months later some 40,000 Africans had been killed and the Portuguese took back control of Pedra Verde, the UPA's last base in northern Angola. Guerrilla actions spread to other regions of Angola, such as Cabinda, the east, the southeast and the central plateaus.

A year later the UPA joined with the Partido Democrático de Angola (PDA) to form the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and the FNLA, still under the leadership of Holden Roberto, immediately proclaimed a Govêrno revolucionário de Angola no exílio (GRAE), a revolutionary government of Angola in exile (based in Kinshasa).

By 1963, with training and arms from Algeria, bases in Congo, and funds from the Organisation de l'Unité Africaine (OUA), the FNLA military and political organisation was becoming formidable. The FLNA drew support from various sources. After winning their independence in 1962, the Algerians supplied the FNLA with arms and ammunition. The French government also supplied it with men and an interest-free loan of 1 million pounds sterling. It also obtained aid from the United States and China.

Roberto declared his organisation to be the sole authority in charge of anti-Portuguese military operations inside Angola. He refused to merge his organisation with other budding nationalist movements, preferring to build the FNLA into an all-Angolan mass movement over which he would preside. Consequently, the anti-colonial Angolan guerrillas were seriously weakened by dissension and the conflict became stalemated.

Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, whom Roberto had appointed to be GRAE's Foreign Minister, left the FNLA in 1964. In response to Roberto's unwillingness to spread the war outside the traditional Kingdom of Kongo, he conceived the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) with Antonio da Costa Fernandes. Savimbi went to China for help and was promised arms and military training.

In 1964, António Agostinho Neto, the MPLA's leader, met the Argentine Marxist revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and soon the MPLA received funding from República de Cuba, Deutsche Demokratische Republik (East Germany), and Sovetsky Soyuz (Soviet Union). After the independence of Zambia in 1964, the MPLA launched a guerrilla war, a Guerra de Libertação, starting in the Cabinda Province, an exclave separated from the rest of Angola by a strip of land belonging to Zaire. The going was tough. The MPLA encountered hostility in Cabinda not only from the Portugeuse, but also from a Cabindan seperatist movement, the Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC).

As it dragged on into the second half of the 1960s, the Guerra de Libertação became stalemated and soon the three nationalist groups (FNLA, MPLA and UNITA) also spent as much time fighting each other as they did fighting the Portuguese.

In 1965, Savimbi visited the United States. He stayed for a month and came back to Africa with military plans and U.S. support. In March 1966, he formally founded UNITA.

In May 1966, Daniel Chipenda, an Ovimbundu and member of the MPLA, opened the Eastern Front in the Moxico and Cuando-Cubango districts. This significantly expanded the MPLA's reach into Angola and the MPLA had become a greater threat to Portugal's colonial rule than the FNLA.

On Christmas Day in 1966, UNITA carried out its first attack on the Portugeuse. At Teixeira de Sousa on the border with Zambia it attempted to stop trains using the Benguela railway. Militarily it was a disaster; almost 300 guerrillas were killed. Politically it placed UNITA on the map. By 1970 UNITA was attempting to extend its influence westwards along the Benguela railway into the centre of the Ovimbundu communities. It met with opposition, not only from the Portuguese security services but also from MPLA forces.

The infighting amongst Angolans increased. The conflict in Angola was becoming an extension of the Cold War. The United States encouraged South African and involvementsends funds to the FNLA and UNITA.

Portugal was also able to receive support from South Africa in its Angolan campaign. South Africa saw itself as the only country on the continent that could stave off the "onslaught of communism" (and all the African independence movements struggling against colonial/white powers were considered "communist"). South African Air Force helicopters were sent to support the Portuguese against UNITA in 1967.

South African Defence Force (SADF) units engaged the MPLA forces in Moxico in February 1972, destroying the Eastern Front. Consequently, up until 1973, the Portuguese forces were able to inflict serious losses on the MPLA. As a result the MPLA was being wrenched apart by factionalism. In 1973, Daniel Chipenda led a rebellion of 1,500 former MPLA followers, the Revolta do Leste, in protest against the MPLA's mestiço-dominated leadership. That same year the Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, convinced the People's Republic of China, which had begun funding the MPLA in 1970, to ally with the FNLA against the MPLA. Roberto visited the PRC in December 1973 and secured Chinese support. By 1974, Mário Coelho Pinto de Andrade had also broken with the MPLA, forming another faction – the Revolta Activa. This lead the Soviet Union to cut off aid to the MPLA.

Portugal was winning the Guerra do Ultramar as the independence fighters fought each other, but then came the Revolução dos Cravos in Lisbon and on 25 April 1974 the government of Marcelo José das Neves Alves Caetano (Salazar's successor) was ousted, ending the Estado Novo. It also spelt the end of Portuguese rule in Angola.

The FNLA was once again by far the most formidable of the Angolan movements at this time, with greater size and more equipment in the hands of its armed wing. Roberto set about building upon this advantage by expanding his force of some 10,000 guerrillas (2,000 were operating inside Angola). Throughout July and August, the FNLA began to move additional forces into northern Angola, and stepped up its military activities against the Portuguese.

At first the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA each negotiated peace agreements with the transitional Portuguese government and began to fight each other for control of Luanda and the country. By July 1974, Neto (MPLA), Roberto (FNLA), and Savimbi (UNITA) had met in Zaire and agreed to negotiate with the Portuguese as one political entity. In January 1975, they met again in Kenya and agreed to stop fighting each other, further outlining constitutional negotiations with the Portuguese. A week later they met for a third time in Alvor (in Portugal) and signed what became known as the Alvor Accords.

In accordance with the Alvor Accords, Agostinho Neto, the leader of the MPLA, declared the independence of the People's Republic of Angola on 11 November 1975. However, UNITA and the FNLA each also declared Angolan independence as the Social Democratic Republic of Angola based in Huambo and the Democratic Republic of Angola based in Ambriz. In Paris, FLEC, which was armed and backed by the French government, declared the independence of the Republic of Cabinda. A bloody struggle for power began.

An estimated 500,000 people were killed in the next 27 years as the Angolan Civil War became the largest, longest and most prominent armed conflict of the Cold War.

Cuba had been involved in Angola with the MPLA since the early 1960s and was, by the spring of 1975, actively training MPLA guerrillas. By May 1975, Cuban officers functioned as a form of general staff for Neto and the MPLA leaders. Consequently South Africa, with the covert assistance of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, began assisting UNITA and the FNLA in a bid to counter-act the rise of the MPLA and ensure that a pro-Western government prevailed.

The United States under President Gerald Ford, still stinging from the defeat in Vietnam, started a quarter of century of war in Angola when it backed a two-pronged invasion by Holden Roberto’s Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) from the Congo/Zaire and from South Africa in support of Savimbi’s UNITA. Ford had approved covert aid to UNITA and the FNLA through "Operation IA Feature" on 18 July 1975.

The South African Defence Force launched "Operation Savannah" and invaded Angola in force on the 2 October 1975. The bulk of the Cuban combat troops arrived after major South African attacks. Sixty Soviet officers that had been based in the Congo joined the Cubans on 12 November. The Soviet leadership expressly forbid the Cubans from intervening in Angola's civil war, focusing the mission on containing South Africa.

Afterwards Henry Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford, would claim that the United States knew nothing about the South African invasion. Documents reveal that not only were the U.S. authorities forewarned, but they helped airlift men and materiel up to the front line. Their intention was to seize the capital, Luanda, before the MPLA could establish itself as Angola’s first independent government. The then U.S. Secretary of Defence, James R. Schlesinger, who had also been a member of Nixon's administration, is recorded saying that the U.S. "might wish to encourage the disintegration of Angola. Cabinda in the clutches of Mobutu would mean far greater security of the petroleum resources." Hundreds of Americans also fought as mercenaries and U.S. spotter planes flew missions over Angola from Zaire.

On 10 November the MPLA forces in the north defeated the FNLA in the Battle of Quifangondo and the FNLA retreated to Zaire. The New York Times of 16 December 1975 claimed that it was only the United States' "assistance" to UNITA and FNLA that stopped MPLA from taking the whole country.

By March of 1976, Cuba had sent around 36,000 troops to the region, mainly to provide logistical support to officers of Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA), Angola's official armed forces under the MPLA government. The MPLA offered bases in Angola to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO); bases from which the Nambian liberation movement could launch attacks against the South African military. The ANC was also allowed to establish guerrilla training camps in Angola.

Now, not only was Angola caught up in its own civil war, it was drawn into the Namibian War of Independence. At first things went well for the MPLA trying to manage these two "fronts". With the assistance of Cuban troops, FAPLA had control over all southern cities by 1977, though roads in the south faced repeated UNITA attacks. Then the SADF planned to launch "Operation Bruilof," but instead launched its second major military operation in Angola — "Operation Reindeer" — attacking Chetequera and Dombondola (near to the then-South-West Africa/Angola border), as well as launching a heliborne assault on SWAPO's Omepepa-Namuidi-Henhombe base complex east of Chetequera. Also included was the attack the operation is most known for — an airborne assault by paratroopers on the town of Kassinga, 260 km inside Angola.

The massacre at Kassinga in May 1979, in which between 800 and 900 people were killed by the South African paratroopers, has been described as South African's equivalent of My Lai. Journalists reaching the town a day after were confronted by the horrific sight of the carnage caused by the SADF attack. Two mass graves – one covered up and apparently containing the bodies of 122 children and the other an open trench in which 582 victims were awaiting burial – provided evidence of the scale of the massacre.

In July 1979, Agostinho Neto issued a decree requiring all citizens to serve in the military for three years upon turning the age of eighteen. In September 1979, after Neto died, José Eduardo dos Santos took office as President of Angola, President of the MPLA, and Commander-in-Chief of FAPLA. Under dos Santos' leadership, Angolan troops crossed the border into Namibia for the first time in October 1979, going into Kavango.

In the 1980s, fighting spread outward from the southeast, where most of the fighting had taken place in the 1970s, and it involved increasing incursions by the SADF. The Angolan government recorded 529 instances in which South African forces violated Angola's territorial sovereignty between January and June 1980.

In June 1980, the SADF launched a full-scale invasion of Angola through Cunene and Cuando-Cubango. They succeeded in destroying the operational command headquarters of the Nambian liberation movement, in what then South African Prime Minister Botha described as a "shock attack."

In June 1985, American conservative activists held a symbolic meeting of anti-Communist militants, what they called the "Democratic International", at UNITA's headquarters in Jamba. Participants included Citizens For America members Lewis Lehrman and (now notorious neoconservative ex-"superlobbyist") Jack Abramoff, Jack Wheeler (an American conservative policy advocate), U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, Adolfo Calero (then leader of Nicaraguan Contras), Pa Kao Her (then Hmong Laotian rebel leader), Abdurrahim Wardak (an Afghan Mujahideen leader), members of South African security forces, and others.

By 1986, American conservatives increased their support for Savimbi's UNITA and the Soviet Union, Cuba and other East bloc nations were reacting by extending their support for the MPLA government.

In a January 1986 interview with Foreign Policy magazine, Savimbi had called the old Gulf Oil (by that time Chevron Corporation's) platforms in Angola a "target" for UNITA. U.S. President Ronald Reagan invited Savimbi to meet with him at the White House and following the meeting, Reagan spoke of UNITA winning a victory that "electrifies the world." Two months later, Reagan announced the delivery of Stinger surface-to-air missiles as part of a $25 million aid package UNITA received from the U.S. government.

In addition to escalating its military support for UNITA, the Reagan administration and its conservative allies also worked to expand recognition of Savimbi as a key U.S. ally in an important Cold War struggle. In response the Soviet Union gave an additional $1 billion in aid to the Angolan government and Cuba sent an additional 2,000 troops to the 35,000-strong force in Angola to protect Chevron oil platforms.

UNITA forces attacked the Cuanza Norte province town of Camabatela in February 1987, and in the following month UNITA massacred civilians in the town of Damba.

Between October 1987 and June 1988, the SADF fought pitched tank and artillery battles with the FAPLA and its Cuban supporters in the south of Angola. It was a turning point in the Angolan civil war, leading to the departure of Cuban, South African and other foreign troops from Angola and Namibia.

In August 1987, four brigades of the FAPLA forces departed from the Angolan city of Cuito Cuanavale with the aim of capturing the UNITA stronghold at Mavinga, which was the gateway to Jonas Savimbi's capital of Jamba (in the southeast of the country just above the finger of land called the Caprivi Strip).

The South African government responded to this FAPLA offensive by launching a series of military operations in conjunction with UNITA forces. They began with "Operation Modular", which involved SADF mechanised battalion equipped with "Olifant" Centurion Main Battle Tanks. FAPLA forces, not expecting the South Africans to attack directly from the south, were virtually destroyed in the Battle of the Lomba River.

Having gained the upper-hand with Operation Modular, South African and UNITA forces then launched "Operation Hooper" to inflict maximum casualties on the retreating FAPLA forces. After a string of defeats, FAPLA forces retreated to the strategically important town of Cuito Cuanavale.

The MPLA, fearing defeat, requested more help from Cuba and Fidel Castro responded by sending - in what was called Maniobra XXXI Aniversario de las FAR - more materiel and 15,000 elite troops to the MPLA's rescue. The first Cuban reinforcements arrived by helicopter in Cuito Cuanavale and repaired some damaged FAPLA equipment. This enabled FAPLA to halt the SADF advance. The SADF moved up reinforcements and then launched the first of what would prove to be five major ground assaults over several months on entrenched FAPLA positions east of the Tumpo river.

By 1988, it had become clear to all sides that a stalemate had been reached, and that a victory would not be achievable without a considerable escalation in the conflict. Since June 1987 there had been a series of peace discussions mediated by U.S. President Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Arthur Crocker. A Cuban delegation joined negotiations in January 1988, the South Africans participated from May, and in August "a de facto cessation of hostilities" was jointly announced by Angola, Cuba and South Africa.

UNITA, which at that time had an army of some 25,000 in Angola, was not party to the agreement and insisted that it would continue fighting. Its position was heavily supported by an American right-wing "think tank," the Heritage Foundation which called for continuing U.S. aid to UNITA "freedom fighters.".

A peace accord was finally signed by the parties in December 1988. South Africa and Cuba both agreed to the withdrawal of their troops from Angola, though the SADF had already effectively withdrawn from Angola some months earlier. The withdrawal of the SADF from Angola did not end the war. The army of UNITA continued fighting.

When George Bush senior came to power in the United States, American support for Savimbi's UNITA had reached a record $50 million. Two military supply flights a day maintained a UNITA campaign that became increasingly brutal and destructive. Whilst in the beginning Savimbi had enjoyed some support among his own Ovimbundu people, by the late 1980s he was reduced to naked coercion, forcing to fight for his army, forcing women into sexual slavery, and seizing the food of poor peasant farmers. Those who challenged his authority would be accused of witchcraft and burnt alive along with their families.

As per the Brazzaville Protocol and the December 1988 New York Accords, Cuban troops began withdrawing from Angola January 1989. They had completely withdrawn by May 1991.

With the Cubans completing their part of the agreement, UNITA and the Angolan government began six rounds of negotiations in April 1991. The sessions were mediated by the Portuguese government while officials from the U.S. and Soviet governments observed. The result was the Bicesse Accords, also known as the Estoril Accords, which laid out a transitional path to multi-party democracy in Angola under the supervision of the United Nations' UNAVEM II mission.

The Angolan government and UNITA agreed to form a Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission and a Joint Commission on the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces. The first was to oversee political reconciliation, while the latter monitored military activity and demobilise the 152,000 active fighters, integrating into a 50,000-strong Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) some FAPLA troops and some UNITA rebels. Multi-party elections, monitored by the U.N., were held in September 1992.

After he failed to win the 1992 presidential election, which the U.N. declared the presidential generally "free and fair," Savimbi attacked all the provincial capitals. The siege of Huambo went on for 55 days. Bombarded with heavy artillery, Cuito was besieged for eight months with 50,000 civilians trapped in the town. 1,000 people a day were dying in Angola by mid-1993. By late 1993, UNITA had gained control over 70% of the country. 120,000 people were killed in those first eighteen months following the 1992 election, nearly half the number of casualties of the previous sixteen years of war.

Then the tables turned on UNITA and it was forced to sue for peace. Savimbi called the situation UNITA's "deepest crisis" since its creation. By October 1994, FAPLA units had begun their final push toward Huambo forcing UNITA into "strategic retreat." Within a month UNITA had lost most of its significant urban and commercial footholds forcibly conscripted hundreds of civilians. Retreating from these towns, UNITA's troops looted extensively and killed a number of civilians.

By November 1994, when the Lusaka Protocal was signed, the MPLA had taken back control of 60% of the country. Yet the Lusaka Protocol called for the government and UNITA to agree a ceasefire and demobilise and then, favouring UNITA, it called for 5,500 UNITA members to join the Angolan National police, 1,200 UNITA members to join the rapid reaction police force, and UNITA generals to become officers in the Angolan Armed Forces. It also gave UNITA politicians homes and a headquarters, and the Santos government agreed to appoint UNITA members to head the Mines, Commerce, Health, and Tourism ministries, in addition to seven deputy ministers, ambassadors, the governorships of Uige, Lunda Sul, and Cuando Cubango, deputy governors, municipal administrators, deputy administrators, and commune administrators. The government would also release all prisoners and give amnesty to all militants involved in the civil war.

Nevertheless, not only did UNITA not demobilise, but it purchased a large quantity of weapons from private sources in Albania and Bulgaria, and from Zaire, South Africa, Republic of the Congo, Zambia, Togo, and Burkina Faso. The U.N. did not effectively enforce the provision prohibiting UNITA from building these weapon stockpiles, and the U.N. Security Council did not authorise a significant peacekeeping force in the area until 1995 and delayed full deployment until late 1996. Despite the Protocol, localised fighting, including targeting of humanitarian agencies, continued throughout 1995. Half of these cease-fire violations were attacks on civilians designed either to control the movement of food aid in contested areas or to stop people from moving into areas controlled by the MPLA. Roads previously cleared of mines had mines laid again overnight, aimed at keeping roads closed and delaying U.N. patrols. By December 1995, the Angolan government and UNITA were again in a state of war.

UNITA was determined to maintain its grip on its remaining diamond assets. The fighting was particularly fierce in the diamond areas throughout 1995. Between 1992 and 1998 UNITA raised about US$2 billion from diamond sales, far more than it ever received from international donors. Its success in mining diamonds, often by exploiting child labour, and then selling them abroad at an inflated price had allowed the war to continue even as the Savimbi's support in the Western world and among the local populace withered away.

Aside from the diamond mines, Angola had at that time, according to a 1999 BBC News report, the greatest concentration of land mines in the world. Fifteen million land mines (one mine to every Angolan) were scattered all over the country effectively rendering a third of the land unusable. There were 70,000 Angolans believed to have lost limbs to land mines, and close to a million that have perished due to the war by the end of the century.

As if gun battles and land mines were not enough to contend with, in 1999 Angolans face a related and equally deadly menace: starvation. Starvation was claiming more than 200 Angolan lives every day. In early 1999, UNITA had laid siege to several provincial centres including Kuito, Malanje and Luena. It also briefly occupied and reportedly looted the northern town of Mbanza Congo. UNITA engaged in a rural depopulation campaign, committing terrible atrocities against what they themselves considered 'their own people' in Central Angola. An estimated one million were forcibly removed,fleeing to the cities and turning them into death traps. Huambo had been been cut off following successive UNITA attacks. Aid workers in Huambo said they could only watch as women and children died, as no food was available.

The second half of 1999 saw a turnaround, fuelled by a massive arms buying spree by the Angolan government. This time the Angolan government was roundly supported by new-found allies Great Britain and, despite its earlier backing of UNITA, the United States.

In accordance with policies set out by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank the Angolan government began to liberalise its economic policies and move to a more market orientated economy in the early 1990s. The Angolan government passed laws
allowing foreign mining companies to apply for and be granted mining concessions. Angola's other key resource, oil, was also of interest to foreign firms.

In the '90s the Angolan Government sought and received millions of dollars from multinational oil companies in exploration rights. Platforms anchored in the ocean off Cabinda were operated by Chevron, and the enclave, which contains some of the richest oil deposits in the world, was being referred to in certain circles as the "Republic of Chevron." The U.S. was Angola's largest trading partner in 1995, purchasing 90 percent of its oil exports. By the turn of the century, those oil companies granted explortion rights wanted to exploit their discoveries and Angolan oil production was set to double.

According to an Associated Press report in October 2000, the U.S. Embassy in Luanda assisted Halliburton in securing a $68 million US Export-Import Bank loan for Angola in 1998. The AP cited a cable from the US Embassy in Luanda to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that states, "Our commercial officer literally camped out at the offices of the national oil company, petroleum ministry and central bank, unraveling snag after snag to obtain the transfer of funds . . . The bottom line: thousands of American jobs and a foot in the door for Halliburton to win even bigger contracts."

In 1999, the Angolan government, now supported by an array of US-based private mercenary companies like MPRI and AirScan, reversed UNITA's gains and in October it took UNITA's central highlands strongholds of Andulo and Bailundo. But by 2000 it was clear that in spite of having lost its de facto capital, UNITA could continue to wreak havoc. Despite U.N. sanctions, UNITA rebels still smuggled at least US$100 million worth of diamonds out of the country that year. The U.N. highlighted the problem of illegitimate "blood diamonds" in a March 2000 report that accused the presidents of Burkina Faso and Togo of accepting diamonds from Savimbi in exchange for illegal weapons and fuel.

In April 2000, UNITA guerillas, scattered after the taking of their headquarters, regrouped and launched a counter-offensive on government troops in the east of Angola near the border with Zambia and Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire). The U.N. Security Council unanimously voted to tighten its sanctions against UNITA and undertook to consider additional measures - use of armed force not included. In July, UNITA forces overran an orphanage in Huambo (at the time a declared safe area), abducting many of the children staying there.

Some stability returned to Angola following Savimbi’s assasination in 2002. A ceasefire between UNITA and the MPLA was signed six weeks after Savimbi's death.

According to US government sources, Savimbi had been tracked by the military forces of U.S. NATO ally Portugal, who were aided by private mercenaries from Israel and South Africa. Jardo Muekalia, who headed UNITA's Washington office until it was forced to close in 1997, said that that the Angolans were supported by commercial satellite imagery and other intelligence support provided by Houston-based Brown & Root. Both the U.S. State Department and Pentagon vehemently denied any U.S. government role in the killing of Savimbi.

In 2001, the Angolan government had earned around US$3-5 billon from oil, most of it supplied to the United States. Soon after the death of Savimbi, President dos Santos visited the U.S., meeting with President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney.

In the year that followed, Walter Kansteiner, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa visited Angola. His public statements focused on the important role that the private sector would play in the new phase begun with the end of the war, and on the importance of the Angola's oil exports to the U.S. By that time, Angola, not a member of OPEC, supplied 5 percent of U.S. oil needs, and that was projected to triple within ten years. In late 2002, the Angolan government deployed some 30,000 soldiers to Cabinda, their mission was to secure the so-called "Chevron Republic."

The FFA's focus on Cabinda led to the virtual destruction of FLEC guerilla forces by mid-2003. It also led to an increase in violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses against the civilian population by the FFA, including killing, arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, and the denial of access to agricultural areas, rivers, and hunting grounds through restrictions on civilians’ freedom of movement.

In early 2005, the Angolan government and opposition political parties negotiated a “package” of electoral laws that would form the legal basis for parliamentary and presidential elections. In 2006, Angola’s planned first national elections since 1992 were postponed yet again. The 29-year conflict in oil-rich Cabinda purportedly ended with the formal signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the government and representatives of an umbrella organization, the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (FDC), which included FLEC and other groups aiming to achieve self-determination.

orana gelar


Wikimedia Atlas of Angola
Amnesty International: Human Rights in Angola
HDI: 0.484 (Rank 2008: 157)


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American Samoa

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It is generally believed that about 3,000 years ago people first arrived and soon settled on the rugged chain of four volcanic islands and a number of lesser nearby islets strung loosely out, west by north, along and across the parallel of 14° south latitude and between 168° and 173° west longitude, 2,500 miles southwest of Hawai'i and 1,800 miles northeast of Te Ika a Māui (the north island of New Zealand). Archaeological evidence certainly suggests that to be the case. The earliest known evidence of human occupation, a Lapita village located in what is now a lagoon on Upulu Island, dates from that time. However, in the legends of the people of these islands there is no suggestion of migration from other lands.

To the people indigenous to this place, the supreme being Tagaloa-Lagi created this place. He had a grandson called Lu, the child of his daughter also named Lu. Tagaloa is said to have been annoyed with the presumptiveness of the boy, and so seized and beat him. Lu escaped, ran down to Earth, and named it Samoa.

Prior to 1830, when agents of the London Missionary Society established a mission, very little of Samoa was known to the world beyond its horizons. In 1722, a Dutchman, Jacob Roggeveen, had been the first European to sight the islands. In 1768, a French explorer, Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, sailed past the islands and named them the Navigator Islands , after encountering Samoans in ocean-going canoes. In 1787 another Frenchman, Jean François de Galaup, comte de La Pérouse, led the first Europeans to set foot on Samoan sand and soil.

After an initially friendly exchange of trading goods and food, the French (it was recorded) caught a Samoan whom they suspected of theft. They hoisted him to the top of a mast by his thumbs. This cruel act provoked a skirmish in which twelve French sailors and about thirty-five Samoans were killed, after which La Pérouse wrote: "I willingly abandoned to others the task of writing the uninteresting history of these barbarous people; a stay of twenty-four hours and the relation of our misfortunes has sufficed to show their atrocious manners."

By the late 1800s the Samoans were victims of the atrocious manners of Imperialists. Samoa became the focal point of an intense territorial dispute between Imperialist Britain, Germany and the USA. They all claimed parts of the kingdom of Samoa for themselves. The imperial Powers, it was said by a Samoan of that time, were "like three large dogs snarling over a very small bone."

The Germans, English and Americans started with a divide and conquer strategy, playing the Samoan peoples off against each other, heightening tensions and encouraging fighting between the Samoan dynastic families. Then, in 1899, they set up a joint commission of three members (Bartlett Tripp for the United States, C. E. N. Elliott for Great Britain, and Freiherr Speck von Sternburg for Germany), called it the "Samoa Tripartite Convention," and agreed to divide the islands amongst themselves.

Britain and Germany traded islands so that Germany took possession of the western islands: Upolu, Savai'i and some smaller islands. The US took possession of the eastern islands, placing Tutuila, Aunu'u, Ofu, Olosega, Ta’u, and Swains and Rose Atoll, under the jurisdiction of the US Department of the Navy.

What was for a time "German Samoa" (and later "Western Samoa") is today the Independent State of Samoa. What became "Amerika Samoa" remains on the UN's "List of Nations to be Decolonized."

From its earliest days, the primary value of Amerika Samoa to the USA has been the deep-water port of Pago Pago, and its ideal location as a strategic foothold in the Pacific. Under US Navy control from 1900 to 1951, Amerika Samoa was initially a coaling station for the fleet in the Age of Steam. During World War II, US Marines in Amerika Samoa outnumbered the local population. Now the value of this colonial possession is its seemingly endless crop of military recruits.

For today, Amerika Samoa is far from a heaven on earth. Local youth aimlessly hang around Pago Pago, which increasingly resembles the ghettos of US cities: abandoned and burned down buildings, general disrepair, population outflow to the suburbs, lack of services, and graffiti covering the walls of the houses.

There are relatively few employment options for the young men and women of Amerika Samoan. The only big employers are tuna canneries and the government, and wages are held very low. So for many signing up, the US military is perceived as the only way out of a life of poverty.

Consequently, Samoans are dying in disproportionate numbers fighting the Bush administration's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

orana gelar


News Archive for American Samoa
Wikimedia Atlas of American Samoa
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Algeria

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A scan of recent news, undertaken in order to start looking into the situation in this part of our world, reveals two key contemporary issues: Exploitation of its resources by an elite on the one hand; and "insurgency" by some of its suffering people on the other.

These are intertwined issues. They are not really "new" issues; they're long running, central issues in this part of the world. An understanding of some of the modern history of the peoples of this place is necessary to get a firm grip on the situation there today.

In Arabic, this country is known as Al-Jaza'ir, meaning "the islands." It's a reference to four islands which once lay off the coast of the city of Algiers (al-jazā’ir banī mazghannā, the islands of the tribe Bani Mazghanna).

To some of its Berber population, calling themselves Imazighen (meaning "free men" in the Tamazight language), this land is known as Dzayer part of Tamazgha.

Possession to plunder

To the French, whose forebears invaded the port city of Alger (Algiers) in 1830 and then engaged in a decades long and particularly violent colonial conquest, this land was first called "French possessions in North Africa" before being called "Algeria" by General Soult in 1839, and later still an "integral part of France." The land, that is, was made "integral" to the homeland of the invading French; not the people of this land, for they were denied French citizenship. Worse than that; French colonialial administration under the régime du sabre (government of the sword) resulted in the "disappearance" of about a third of the Algerian population.

How did such a great proportion of the population perish?

Plundering by colon (colonisers); violence done to the indigenous people to enable it.

French authorities took possession of the beylik lands even before the French made the decision to annex Algeria. Europeans had poured into Algiers after it fell to the French invasion force in the summer of 1830. The plundering had begun.

To name but one example of it, the French soldier-politician Bertrand Clauzel and others formed a company to acquire agricultural land. They subsidised the settlement of that land by European farmers, triggering a land rush. Commercial interests with influence in the government also began to recognise the prospects for profitable land speculation in expanding the French zone of occupation. Their greed seemed unsatiable.

The colons sought to exploit the country's agricultural resources for the benefit of France (the concept of l'Algérie Française - French Algeria - becoming ingrained in the French collective mind), but this colonisation proved costly. In 1834, when France annexed the occupied areas of Algeria, it had an estimated Muslim population of about four million. France needed to mobilise large numbers of troops and it was reaping meagre benefits to begin with.

A number of deputies at the National Assembly called for the troops to be withdrawn from Algeria. Others suggested that they stay and occupy only a limited amount of territory (that grabbed so far). A third group advocated colonisation and full-scale war, claiming that repeated raids were necessary to destroy the power of the resistance leader `Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā'irī and ruin the tribes
that supported him.

`Abd al-Qādir, recognised as amir al muminin (commander of the faithful) by Algerian tribal elders in 1832, had quickly gained the support of tribes throughout Algeria. A devout and austere marabout, he was also a cunning political leader and a resourceful warrior he proved himself effective in applying the tactics of asymetrical warfare and was successful in uniting the tribes against the French. He set about building a territorial Muslim state based on the communities of the interior but drawing its strength from the tribes and religious brotherhoods.

Resistance

For nearly a decade, `Abd al-Qādir scored many victories against the French invaders. By 1839, he controlled more than two-thirds of Algeria.

`Abd al-Qādir stands out as one of the most significant national heros of Algeria, and is often considered the founder of the Algerian state, not only because of his political actions, but also because his schemes for education brought consciousness of independence to the people of Algeria. He was also noted for his chivalry; and it is said that on one occasion he released French captives simply because he had insufficient food to feed them.

Yet the French in Algiers viewed with concern the success of an Algerian Muslim government and the rapid growth of a viable territorial state that barred the extension of European settlement. They wanted his "insurgency" defeated. By 1840, the French supporters of policies of colonisation and full-scale war had gained the upper hand. Colonial conquest accelerated and the means employed were atrocious. The French army stole harvests and livestock and destroyed orchards; massacred or deported villagers en masse; raped women and took children hostage.

Alexis de Tocqueville toured the land under conquest and reported his view in 1841. He supported colonisation in general, and in particular the colonisation of Algeria:


As far as I am concerned, I came back from Africa with the pathetic notion that at present in our way of waging war we are far more barbaric than the Arabs themselves. These days, they represent civilization, we do not. This way of waging war seems to me as stupid as it is cruel. It can only be found in the head of a coarse and brutal soldier.

Indeed, it was pointless to replace the Turks only to reproduce what the world rightly found so hateful in them. This, even for the sake of interest is more noxious than useful; for, as another officer was telling me, if our sole aim is to equal the Turks, in fact we shall be in a far lower position than theirs: barbarians for barbarians, the Turks will always outdo us because they are Muslim barbarians.

In France, I have often heard men I respect but do not approve of, deplore that crops should be burnt and granaries emptied and finally that unarmed men, women and children should be seized. In my view these are unfortunate circumstances that any people wishing to wage war against the Arabs must accept.

I think that all the means available to wreck tribes must be used, barring those that the human kind and the right of nations condemn.

I personally believe that the laws of war enable us to ravage the country and that we must do so either by destroying the crops at harvest time or any time by making fast forays also known as raids the aim of which it to get hold of men or flocks.

Whatever the case, we may say in a general manner that all political freedoms must be suspended in Algeria.


Also indicative of the prevailing attitude of the French colonialists about that situation is a passage from a letter written by Lieutenant-Colonel de Montagnac on 15 March 1843:


"All populations which do not accept our conditions must be despoiled. Everything must be seized, devastated, without age or sex distinction: grass must not grow any more where the French army has put the foot. Who wants the end wants the means, whatever may say our philanthropists. I personally warn all good militaries which I have the honour to lead that if they happen to bring me a living Arab, they will receive a beating with the flat of the saber... This is how, my dear friend, we must do war against Arabs: kill all men over the age of fifteen, take all their women and children, charged the buildings with them [i.e. probable allusion to military brothels], send them to the Marquesas Islands or elsewhere. In one word, annihilate all that will not crawl beneath our feet like dogs."


A couple of years later Alexis de Tocqueville returned to Algeria and carried out a systematic survey of the military situation, of the state of the country and its inhabitants - both natives and colons. He wrote again about the "Algerian problem," openly advocating racial segregation between the European colonists and the "Arabs." The French colonial state, as he conceived it and as it took shape in Algeria, was a two-tiered organisation, quite unlike the regime in mainland France. It introduced two different political and legal systems which, in his analysis, were based on racial, cultural and religious distinctions. According to de Tocqueville, the system that should apply to the colonisers would enable them alone to hold property and travel freely, but would deprive them of any form of political freedom, which should be suspended in Algeria:


"There should therefore be two quite distinct legislations in Africa, for there are two very separate communities. There is absolutely nothing to prevent us treating Europeans as if they were on their own, as the rules established for them will only ever apply to them."


Within a few years nearly all of northern Algeria was under French control and then the occupied lands were declared "an integral part of France". In 1848, the French made Algeria a département attached to France.

Later, the loss of the lands of Alsace-Lorraine to Prussia (in 1871 after the Franco-Prussian War) led to pressure on the French government to make more land in Algeria available to colons. Soon, both the amount of land "aquired" and the number of colons had doubled, and tens of thousands more unskilled Muslims were uprooted from their land, some wandered into the cities or to colon farming areas in search of work.

Naturally, from the very beginning of the French colonial conquest there was an Algerian resistance (or, depending on perspective, an "insurrection" aka "insurgency"). The French faced an "insurgency" for more than 50 years; indeed, in some ways it could be said the resistance against foreign rule over this land ran for more than a century. There was the three Jihads of `Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā'irī (the first hero of Algerian independence); the resistance of Lalla Fatma N'Soumer; and Mohamed ben Abdallah (aka Bou Baghla). There were pitched battles in 1849, 1851, 1852, 1853,1857, 1864, 1870, and 1871 and again in 1881. And the Algerian Moussebilines - young unmarried people- volunteered to die for their cause. They swore not to fear any danger. They were initiated at a ceremony, a prayer for the dead was said for them, and they officially gave their lives to the country.

Consequently, to maintain their control the occupiers resorted to the tools of oppression. In 1871, in the aftermath of the Kabyle rebellion (launched under the leadership of Muhammad al-Muqrani), French authorities imposed stern measures to punish and control the whole Muslim population. France confiscated more than 5,000 km² of tribal land and placed the Kabyle under a régime d'exception (extraordinary rule).

Repression

By 1881, a Code de l'Indigénat (a set of laws creating, in practice, an inferior legal status for natives of French Colonies) officialised discrimination, creating specific penalties for indigenes, undermining their social structures and enabling continued appropriation of their lands.

By the 1880s the European population of Algeria was more than 350,000. The process of refoulement, the "thrusting back" of the native population away from fertile and productive areas, carried out since the earliest days of the conquest, continued and indigenous people were forced into "relocation" camps in the desert, so as to make room for colons and their new towns and villages.

Algeria in the late 1800s was a country with few traditional elites as the social structure, which had been established over centuries, had been completely destroyed by the French military and civilian/colon governments. Gone was the millet system; gone were the Koughloughis, the makhzen tribes, and influential sherifs.

So it was for much of the 19th century, and into the 20th, that the policies of the French government toward the Algerians alternated between benign neglect and harsh repression. It certainly tended towards the latter whenever resistance to French rule was re-energised. And, so it was that in all that 19th century colonial occupation, the Francophone culture forced on the place by colon did not trickle down from the upper levels, and the population native to the colonised land deeply resented the awarding of their communal and confiscated land to immigrants from foreign lands.

At the turn of the century Europeans held about 30% of the total arable land, including the bulk of the most fertile land and most of the areas under irrigation. By 1900, Europeans produced more than two-thirds of the value of output in agriculture and practically all agricultural exports. And it was a period when poverty among Muslim Algerians was widespread, with many forced to seek work on European "owned" farms at extremely low wages.

Inflation, brought on by European speculators, had diminished the purchasing power of poor Muslim Algerians and they'd long been denied any political power. To make matters worse, the colonial regime imposed more and higher taxes on Algeria's Muslim majority than on the European colons who were profiting from the long plundering of Algeria.

In 1909, for instance, Algerian Muslims, who made up almost 90% of the population but produced 20% of Algeria's income, paid 70% of direct taxes and 45% of the total taxes collected. And colons controlled how these revenues would be spent. As a result, colon towns had handsome municipal buildings, paved streets lined with trees, fountains and statues, while Algerian villages and rural areas benefited little, if at all, from tax revenues.

Re-emergent resistance

The underprivileged majority population in Algeria finally began to make itself heard during the 20th century when a new generation of local resistance leadership emerged at the time the Western (European/Imperial) world was headed toward a "Great" War. Three movements emerged and they grew to maturity during the 1920s and 1930s.

One movement, originating from the period before World War I amongst a small but influential class of évolués (Algerians whom had managed to gain an education in French colon form), was expressed through a loose movement given the name Jeunesse Algérienne (Young Algerians). Algerians were French subjects but not French citizens (hence Algerians embodied a significant exception to the established French republican 'model' that -- for men at least -- combined nationality and citizenship), and so theirs was a "nationalism" developed out disappointment in not receiving full equality with the French, even after they'd "evolved" to better assimilate into the imposed French colonial culture.

The Jeunesse Algérienne pursued gradualist, reformist tactics, shunned illegal actions, and as "assimilationist" were prepared to consider permanent union with France if the rights of Frenchmen could be extended to native Algerians. Indeed, in 1908, Jeunesse Algérienne delivered to France's then Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, a petition expressing opposition to a proposed policy to conscript Muslim Algerians into the French army. A deal was offered. If the state granted the Muslims full citizenship, the Jeunesse Algérienne opposition to conscription would be dropped.

In 1911, in addition to demanding preferential treatment for "the intellectual elements of the country," the group called for an end to unequal taxation, broadening of the franchise, more schools, and protection of indigenous property. Their calls did not cut through the French colonial imperative.

In May 1913, a limited form of selective conscription was applied to the Muslim population of Algeria. Then, during World War I, 173,000 Algerians (80,000 conscripted) served the French in the Armée d’Afrique ; and 36,000 were killed.

















Whilst the Jeunesse Algérienne were the Algerian equivalents of the political class who led their countries to independence in most former European colonial territories, they had no such chance in Algeria. Their roots in Algerian society were too shallow and the colon resisted even small reformist measures that might have led, however slowly, to piecemeal and peaceful liberation.

The fact that Jeunesse Algérienne were overwhelmingly from the Muslim middle and professional classes separated them from their impoverished countrymen. Their secularism caused suspicion towards them from the rest of the largely conservative Muslim population and traditional leadership. They were not viewed as being as "authentic" as the more traditionalist Islamic elites. Their accommodationist stance also made them seem as if they were a fifth column. It was not to Jeunesse Algérienne that most Algerian Muslims looked to when they felt they needed to take political action.

Algerian Muslims mostly turned to another of the movements to emerge, Vieux Turbans (Old Turbans' , which had been inspired by the religious Salafi school of thought founded in the late 19th century in Egypt by Sheikh Muhammad 'Abduh (a student of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani) and his own most prominent disciple, Muhammad Rashid Rida. Their motives were reformist; religious and cultural. They were certainly not assimilationist or accommodationist; indeed they could not be, for to obtain French citizenship, Algerian Muslims were required to renounce their Muslim identity.

To dent any self-doubt among the Muslims, Vieux Turbans promoted pan-Islamic ideas, recalling the glories of both Algeria’s Islamic past and those of the wider Muslim world. They established free Islamic schools that stressed Arabic language and culture as an alternative to the schools for Muslims operated for many years by the French. Islam was made a sort of marker of identity for most of the people of Al-Jaza'ir.

For many Algerians, and especially those who sympathised most with the Vieux Turbans, "Islam had become consciously or unconsciously the principal repository of the collective personality and the ultimate psychological bulwark against total domination by the Christians." Whereas Jeunesse Algérienne opposed the French colonial administration for its legal hypocrisy and inequality, Vieux Turbans opposed it because they viewed it as a "Christian occupation" of a "Muslim land". This perspective was shared by many Algerian Muslims, who viewed their inferior status to the French settler establishment as being one of religion; because they were Muslims they were turned into a community of proletarians. Had they been Christians, the logic went, they would not be so poor, nor would they have been abused in the manner in which they were.

In 1924, Shiekh 'Abd al-Hamid Ibn Muhammad Ibn Makkee Ibn Baadees as-Sinhaajee (aka 'Ben Badis'), famed for the motto, "Islam is our religion, Arabic our language, Algeria our fatherland," began publishing al-Muntaqidh (The Censor), which had the twin objectives of promoting the internal renewal of Algerian Islam and of protecting it against the many forms of secularist attack emanating from the colonial world. After 18 issues had been published, the occupying French authorities stopped it (in November 1925). Ostensibly the French censored Ben Badis' paper because an article supported the Rif rebellion in Morocco. Ben Badis replaced al-Muntaqidh with the monthly al-Shihab (The Shooting Star).

In the 1920s the colon population grew by more than a quarter million. Most of the immigrants were now from Russia, mainly Jews and Armenians escaping the aftermath of the Russian civil war. A major characteristic of the earlier settler society in Algeria was its antisemitism. In the early twentieth century, antisemitic colon newspapers flourished in Algeria, and numerous colon politicians from major cities were elected on antisemitic platforms. European antisemites in Algeria also tried to incite Algerian Muslims to act against the Jews, but without great success.

In attempting to renew Algerian Islam, Ben Badis and his colleagues were necessarily critical of an existing Islamic establishment they held responsible for Algerian Islam's sorry state. Sometimes they targeted the state-salaried ulama who staffed the official sponsored mosques. Far more frequently they attacked the marabouts (holy men) and the mystic brotherhoods and zawiyas whose unorthodox versions of Islam were deeply ingrained in popular culture and dominated the countryside where the great majority of Algerians lived. Since the official clergy were agents of the state and many of the zawiya leaders had been co-opted by it as well, attempts at religious renewal could not help but bear considerable political significance.

By 1931, some of the zawiya sought an agreement with Ben Badis' followers on the basis of a common program of religious and moral renewal. They created the Association des Uléma Musulmans Algériens (AAMU) with Ben Badis as its leader. In 1933, French authorities forbade Ben Badis and his reformist allies to preach in official mosques. This move and similar ones sparked several years of sporadic religious unrest. A veritable war of religion in Algeria over the next four years culminated with the assassination in 1936 of the official Malikite mufti of Algiers.

Ben Badis pronounced "that this Algerian nation is not France, cannot be France, and does not want to be France . . . [but] has its culture, its traditions and its characteristics, good or bad, like every other nation of the earth."

The other movement to emerge in the early 20th century, a more proletarian and radical type, grew out of the fact that several hundred thousand Algerians had assisted the French during World War I by working in factories. They became aware of a standard of living higher than any they had known at home and of democratic political concepts, taken for granted by Frenchmen in France, which colons, soldiers, and bureaucrats had refused to apply to the Muslim majority in Algeria. Some had also become acquainted with the pan-Arab nationalism growing in the Middle East.

Emerging to defend "the material, moral, and social interests of North African Muslims," the Étoile Nord-Africain, known as Étoile (Star), was originally formed to coordinate political activity among Algerian and other North African workers in France. It had no armed wing and it attempted to organise peacefully.

In 1927, Étoile leader, Ahmed Messali Hadj, stated the movement's goals as independence from France, freedom of the press and freedom of association, a parliament chosen through universal suffrage, confiscation of large estates and land reform, and education of the people through the institution of Arabic schools. The agenda had appeal; the movement grew to about 4,000 members inside France by 1929. France then banned Étoile and Ahmed Messali Hadj was made an outlaw and fugitive.

With its leader targeted by the French, Étoile continued operating underground until 1933. It was then reorganised, and, in 1936, Etoile joined the French Front Populaire, a coalition of French political parties of the left (which had risen to power by that time). However, the relationship lasted a little over six months. The Front Populaire dissolved Etoile in January 1937.

Two months later Ahmed Messali Hadj formed the Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA). Despite using peaceful methods of protest, the group's members were pursued by the police in France and banned by French colonial authorities in Algeria. In November 1937, Ahmed Messali Hadj was arrested and put on trial for "agitation"; he was imprisoned for several years and the PPA operated as a clandestine organisation from 1938.

In 1940, when the Deutsches Reich invaded France, Algerian Muslims rallied to the French side (just as they had done in World War I). After the Fall of France, thousands of foreigners (including European Jews) who had volunteered for and fought in the French army against the Nazi Germans in 1940, as well as many foreign Jewish refugees, were sent by the collaborationist Vichy regime to 'work camps' in Algeria (and neighbouring Morocco).

Re-newed repression

The authoritarian and backward-looking Révolution nationale of Philippe Pétain's Vichy government appealed to the colons/pied-noirs. The French Algerian administration vigorously enforced the Vichy regime's anti-Semitic laws, which abrogated the 1870 Cremieux Decree and stripped Algerian Jews of their French citizenship. Potential opposition leaders in both the European and Algerian Muslim communities were arrested. Those whom had escaped went underground.

Then, on November 8, 1942, as the U.S. 34th Infantry (with one brigade of the British 78th) were approaching the shores of Algiers, a group of 400 French resistance under the command of Henri d'Astier de La Vigerie and José Aboulker staged a coup in the city. When the Americans landed, the native Algerian population breathed a sigh of relief, seeing a possible path towards self-determination.

Yet, once the Americans had won control of North Africa, they put in charge the man who had surrendered Algiers, Admiral François Darlan despite him having formerly been Pétain's deputy and minister for the interior, defence and foreign affairs. Darlan maintained Nazi-inspired racist laws and deported people to Vichy concentration camps.

An alternative French 'saviour' of Algeria, Général de Gaulle had left his British exile for the ‘French’ soil of Algiers after its 'liberation'. Yet he made a declaration on 30 May 1943, dashing the hopes of Algerian nationalists by emphasising the ‘integrity and sovereignty’ of all parts of the French Empire.

Another Algerian leader to emerge in the period was Ferhat Abbas (who would later become president of the provisional Algerian nationalist government-in-exile - the GPRA - and then in 1962 become President of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic). Abbas had been an integrationist; he had not been opposed to continuing French annexation; though he had advocated an Algeria where Algerians would have the same rights as Frenchmen. By the 1940s, he'd also abandoned assimilation as a viable alternative to self-determination, issuing the Manifesto of the Algerian People in 1943.

The Manifesto may be seen as the culmination of the nationalist pressures building from 1890 to the 1940s, the formal renunciation of assimilation and the affirmation of Algerian nationalism by the Algerian Muslim leadership. It called for the release of all Algerian political prisoners, the recognition of Arabic as the official language of Algeria on equal terms with French, the recognition of the civic liberties and responsibilities of Muslims unconditionally, land reform, and the creation of an Algerian Constitution that recognised the full equality of Muslims and Europeans under the law.

In 1944, Abbas gained the support of the AAMU and formed the Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté (AML) and within a short time, the AML's newspaper, Égalité, claimed 500,000 subscribers, indicating unprecedented interest in independence.

Vive l'indépendance

In 1945, anti-French sentiment across Algeria had been building, leading to thousand-person protests in some cities. On the morning of May 8, 1945 (VE day), 4,000 Algerians took to the streets of the market town of Sétif, in northern Algeria, to press their demands for independence on the colonial government.

Trouble started when police tried to seize the PPA flag (now the Algerian flag) and banners calling for the release of Messali Hadj and Algerian independence. At around 9 am, a crowd chanting “Vive l'indépendance!” marched on the French gendarmerie (which had shot at the Algerians carrying the flags they felt represented their independance). The French then fired on the largely unarmed crowds. They used machine guns; they killed a great many of the marching Algerian Muslims in Sétif that day.

In the following five days of chaos the French implemented a 'shock and awe' approach to crush resistance. They used artillery and air force bombers to attack Algerians in the neighbourhoods and surrounding villages of both Sétif and nearby Guelma. They massacred thousands and to remove all traces of their crimes (thus preventing investigations), they opened mass graves and burned bodies in the lime kilns at Heliopolis. Indeed, the French actions caused a French military historian, Jean-Charles Jauffret, to say that the conduct of its army in Algeria “resembled a European wartime operation rather than a traditional colonial war.”

Even so, when founding the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA) in 1946, Ferhat Abbas once again asserted the demands of the Manifesto and called for a free, secular, and republican Algeria loosely federated with France.

Messali and his PPA on the other hand still rejected anything short of full independence. Some AML members joined the PPA and, under Messali's leadership, they reorganised as the Mouvement Pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques (MTLD). The MTLD retained the platform promoted by the PPA, i.e., full independence for Algeria, and like the PPA, it pursued a peaceful political path to achieve an independent Algeria. It enjoyed a sweeping victory in the 1947 municipal elections and this frightened the colons, whose political leaders, through fraud and intimidation, attempted to obtain a result more favourable to them in the following year's first Algerian Assembly voting. The MTLD picked up only nine seats in that élection algérienne, and whilst this result may have reassured some of the colons that the nationalists had been rejected by the Algerian Muslim community, these rigged elections suggested to many Muslims that a peaceful solution to Algeria's problems was not possible.

Then, at the first session of the colon-controlled Algerian Assembly, a MTLD delegate was arrested at the door, prompting other Muslim representatives to walk out in protest. The Algeria nationalist parties, joined by the Parti Communiste Algérien (PCA), formed a common political front that undertook to have the results of the election voided. By 1950, the MTLD was being repressed by French police.

So although relatively peaceful attempts were made for a Constitution and more equality in the 1940s, these were met with no support by the French government and the characteristics of colonial rule in Algeria virtually ruled out any nationalist option other than one based on organised violence.

Hence, in 1947, the Organisation Spéciale was formed by more radical participants of the PPA and MTLD to prepare for armed struggle against French rule over Algeria. Led by Hocine Aït Ahmed, it had recruited around 1500-2000 members at its peak. It spawned the groups that would later form the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); which, in turn, became the leading force in the Algerian War of Independence.

Guerre d'Algérie

The Algerian War of Independence lasted from 1954 to 1962. It brought the displacement of millions of peasants, the dismantling of the economy and resulted in hundreds of thousands of dead. It brought to almost every Algerian family the loss of a member.

It started in the early morning hours of All Saints' Day, 1 November 1954. Between midnight and two o'clock a.m. Algeria was awakened by explosions. The FLN, formed by Ahmed Ben Bella, an ex-sergeant in the French army, and eight other Algerian exiles in Egypt, began to fight for Algerian independence by executing a campaign of coordinated attacks on public buildings, military and police posts, and communications installations. The French would henceforth call this day Toussaint Rouge.

The FLN called for "restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam." The political and military situation augured well for their success. Among the nine million Muslims of Algeria, living side by side with one million Europeans who dominated the political and economic life of Algeria, a large majority could be expected to join a war of independence.

At first the FLN fellaghas (whom the French called maquisards — or "terrorists"), numbered in the hundreds and were armed with a motley assortment of hunting rifles and discarded French, German, and United States light weapons. effectively immobilised French forces. They were successfully applying hit-and-run tactics according to the classic canons of guerrilla warfare. They set up ambushes and conducted night raids, avoiding direct contact with superior French firepower. They targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colon farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities. Once an engagement was broken off, the fellaghas merged with the population in the countryside.

French reaction to the rapidly expanding "insurgency" was at first slow and haphazard. Early in 1956, however, rioting by colons / pied noir who had considerable support in France) forced a change in French policy. François Mitterrand, French minister of interior at that time, proclaimed "the only possible negotiation is war." That spring, newly drafted soldiers and reservists recalled to active duty poured into Algeria, allowing the French to pass from a desultory defensive to the offensive, and to launch full-scale military operations. By the end of 1956, France had committed more than 400,000 troops to Algeria. The conflict escalated.

Then the French gradually gained an upper hand by using "counter-insurgency" tactics. On January 15, 1955, the main leader of the FLN in Constantinois, Didouche Mourad, was killed during a skirmish with the French army. A month later, on February 11, the FLN leader in the Aurès, Mostefa Ben Boulald, was arrested.

Nevertheless, the FLN's military arm, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) evolved into a disciplined fighting force. It effectively had two levels of organisation. The soldiers operating inside Algeria operated as guerilla units. The troops abroad, in Morocco and Tunisia, were organised into a regular army, consisting of some 30,000 soldiers. During 1956 and 1957, the FLN successfully applied hit-and-run tactics in accordance with guerrilla warfare theory, which was at the time being formalised (in particular by Mao) as "people's war".

Late in 1957, General Raoul Salan, commander-in-chief of the French forces in Algeria, constructed a heavily patrolled system of barriers to limit infiltration from Tunisia and Morocco. With a barbed wire fence built along the borders to Morocco and Tunisia, ALN troops outside Algeria were hindered from making swift and effective attacks into Algerian territory.

Salan also instituted a system of quadrillage to fight the ALN within Algeria. It involved dividing the country into sectors in order to isolate the people within while combing through the enclosed area in a search for "insurgents" and their supporters. Each sector was permanently garrisoned by troops responsible for suppressing FLN/ALN operations in their assigned territory.

Having "quarterised" the country, Salan then applied a theory of "counter-revolutionary warfare" that he had developed in Indochina. As part of the French "pacification" operation, collective punishment was meted out to whole villages suspected of aiding FLN fellaghas. In the name of "pacification", French army units raided Muslim villages and slaughtered civilians. The French "pacification" measures included colon vigilante units conducting "unauthorised activities" (with the passive cooperation of French police authorities). These activities included carrying out ratonnades (literally, rat-hunts) against suspected FLN members of the Algerian Muslim community. Other groups were deported to guarded refugee camps. The French military attempted to justify its use of torture with claims that they were leading a "pacification" operation against "FLN terrorism."

Salan would go on to found the French far-right nationalist underground militant organisation Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS), with its motto: L’Algérie est française et le restera. Indeed, the French use of concentration camps, torture, and mass executions of civilians suspected of aiding the rebels, isolated France and elicited invidious comparisons with totalitarian regimes and Nazism.

The French administration also recruited as an irregular militia some Algerian Muslims, the core of them veterans of L'Armee d' Afrique who'd fought for the French in Indochina. These Harkis (from the Arabic word Haraka, "the movement") sided with the French for assorted reasons: for the regular pay, out of loyalty to a French army officer, to be on the side of the likely winners, to avenge a member of their family killed by the FLN, to obey their chief (bachaga), because they were Francophiles, or because, following the French army's "pacification", they were perceived as traitors to their own people and thus many suffered violence at the hands of the FLN/ALN.

By spring of 1958 the French Army could claim that it was winning the war against the ALN. In the first seven months of that year the ALN had lost more than 25,000 men. The French army shifted its tactics at the end of 1958 from dependence on quadrillage to the use of mobile forces deployed on massive search-and-destroy missions against ALN strongholds. The French military and police used torture to try to get information about the FLN.

In exile the FLN formed a Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA). Based in Tunis, it was headed by Ferhat Abbas and secured recognition by Morocco, Tunisia, and several other Arab countries, by a number of Asian and African states, and by the Soviet Union and other East European states.

Revelation

At about this time Henri Alleg, a pied noir published La Question, an account of his experience a year earlier of being tortured over the course of a month by members of France's 10th Paratrooper Division. Alleg (born Henri Salem) had been the publisher of l'Humanité (a French Communist newspaper) advocating indepedence for Algeria, but he was not a member of the FLN. Nevertheless, while in French custody Alleg was submitted to many kinds of cruel tortures, both physical and mental. The French aimed to get him to reveal the names of those who had sheltered him. His "treatment" consisted of electric shocks, burning, being hung from various appendages, and being forced swallowing and inhaling of water to simulate drowning (a torture now known as "water boarding").

The revelation that the French government was using torture against its own citizens (as well as the FLN) further eroded mainland popular support for the French military action in Algeria. The war became a reason for the downfall of the Fourth Republic. Colon extremists and French army officers joined forces to bring down the French government and demanded the return of General Charles De Gaulle to lead France to victory over the Algerian nationalists and the preservation of "French Algeria". De Gaulle returned to power with the support of the extreme right. however he soon realised that the war could never be won and announced a referendum allowing Algerians to choose their own destiny, be it independence or remaining an "integral part of France".

De Gaulle's move was seen as betrayal by the colon, the extreme right wing and certain parts of the military. In Francoist Spain, the Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS) was formed by Pierre Lagaillarde (who led the 1960 Siege of Algiers), General Raoul Salan (who took part in the 1961 Algiers putsch or "Generals' Uprising") and Jean-Jacques Susini, along with other members of the French Army, including Yves Guérin-Sérac, and former members of the French Foreign Legion from the First Indochina War. Their slogan was "Algeria is French and so it will remain." Their terrorism aimed to prevent Algerian independence. They engaged in a campaign of bombings and assassinations in Algeria and mainland France, including several attempts on de Gaulle's life.

De Gaulle believed that while the war in Algeria was militarily winnable, it was not defensible internationally, and he became reconciled to Algeria’s eventual independence. Negotiations between representatives of the French government and the FLN began in Evian on 7 March 1962. The Evian accords, signed on 18 March 1962, gave independence to Algeria. De Gaulle hoped that they would form the basis for Algeria and France to "march fraternally together along the road of civilisation". The OAS set upon a "scorched earth" policy to deny French-built development to the future FLN government. Within just a few months, 900 thousand colon left the country.

The war of national liberation and its aftermath severely disrupted Algeria's society and economy. In addition to the physical destruction, the exodus of the colon stripped the country of most of its managers, civil servants, engineers, teachers, physicians, and skilled workers — all occupations which colonial policy had prevented or discouraged the Muslim population from pursuing. The homeless and displaced numbered in the hundreds of thousands, many suffering from illness, and some 70 percent of the work force was unemployed. Distribution of goods was at a standstill. Departing colons destroyed or carried off public records and utility plans, leaving public services in a shambles.

In preparation for independence, the Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (CRNA) had met in Tripoli in May 1962 to work out a plan for the FLN's transition from a liberation movement to a political party. The Tripoli Program called for land reform, the large-scale nationalisation of industry and services, and a strong commitment to nonalignment and anticolonialism in foreign relations.

The platform also envisioned the FLN as a mass organisation, broad enough to encompass all nationalist groups. Adoption of the Tripoli Program notwithstanding, deep personal and ideological divisions surfaced within the FLN as the war drew to a close and the date for independence approached. Competition and confrontation among various factions not only deprived the FLN of a leadership that spoke with a single voice, but also almost resulted in full-scale civil war.

The ALN commanders and the GPRA struggled for power. The GPRA installed itself in Algiers as the Provisional Executive. In June 1962, Mohamed Ahmed Ben Bella, who was becoming more popular, and thereby more powerful, challenged the leadership of Premier Benyoucef Ben Khedda. This led to several disputes among Ben Bella's rivals in the FLN, which were quickly suppressed by Ben Bella's rapidly growing number of supporters, most notably within the armed forces.

Colonel Houari Boumédiènne, chief of staff of the ALN in Morocco, formed an alliance with Ahmed Ben Bella. Together with Mohamed Khider and Rabah Bitat, they announced the formation of the Bureau Politique as a rival government to the GPRA. Boumédiène's army, built up outside the war zone in Morocco and Tunisia, quashed resistance among GPRA loyalists and guerrilla units inside Algeria, as it moved in from its border area bases. By September 1962, Ben Bella and Boumédiènne were in control of Algeria.

Free at last?

The creation of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria was formally proclaimed at the opening session of the National Assembly on 25 September, 1962. Ferhat Abbas, a moderate unconnected with the Bureau Politique, was elected president of the assembly by the delegates, and Ben Bella was named prime minister. On the following day, Ben Bella formed a cabinet that was representative of the Bureau Politique but that also included Boumédiènne, who was named defense minister and vice president. The ALN was organised as the country's armed forces.

The institution of the new Algeria Presidency was soon sidelined by Ben Bella. Ferhat Abbas resigned in protest at the FLN's decision to establish a one-party state under Ben Bella. But, it is said, within just a short time Ben Bella's eccentric and arrogant behaviour towards colleagues alienated many former supporters. Ben Bella was promoting the development of his own cult of personality, and by 1964 he was dedicating more time to foreign affairs than local development.

In 1965, Ben Bella was deposed by the army strongman. Boumédiènne seized power in a bloodless coup. Algeria's new constitution and nacsent political institutions were abolished, and Boumédiènne ruled through a Revolutionary Council of his own (mostly military) supporters. Within Algeria repression would continue, dissent would not be tolerated.

Boumédienne would rule as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council until 12 December 1976, and from then on as President of Algeria to his death on 27 December 1978. The death of Boumédienne left a power vacuum in Algeria which could not easily be filled. For a short time, Rabah Bitat was acting President, but yet another army strongman, Chadli Bendjedid, became president in February 1979.

Some hold Bendjedid responsible for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria. It is argued that, contrarily to his predecessor, Bendjedid tolerated the rise of various Islamist grassroots movements during the 1980s. The development of Islamic activism in Algeria in the 1980s resembled that elsewhere in North Africa and, as in 1970s Egypt, the authorities both actively helped to bring it into existence and sought to use it for their own purposes.

But the government could not maintain complete control. Under both Boumédienne and then Benjedid, Algeria's economic had relied heavily on high oil prices, and when, in 1986, oil prices went from $30 to $10 a barrel, the planned economy came under severe strain, with shortages and unemployment rife. Demographic changes within the nation, brought about largely by the modernisation drive of the Bendjedid regime, fed into the development of two conflicting protest movements in the late '80s: communists, including Berber identity movements; and Islamic intégristes. Many young Algerians felt alienation from a state which seemed no longer to offer them prospects. Their protests were violently repressed.

A new resistance

In October 1988, a "Black October", massive demonstrations were mounted against President Bendjedid. There was an Islamist element prominent among the demonstrators. The army fired on the demonstrators, killing many and shocking many more. Benjedid's response was to make moves towards "free market" reform, but the riot and repressive response had set in motion a process of internal regime power-struggles and public criticism that eventually led to the downfall of the Algerian single-party system. power since 1962.

In November 1988, the Algerian Constitution was amended to allow parties other than the ruling FLN. The Islamist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), led by an elderly sheikh, Abbassi Madani, and a charismatic young mosque preacher, Ali Belhadj, was founded shortly afterwards in Algiers.

In 1991, the military intervened to stop elections from bringing the FIS to power, forcing Bendjedid out of office and sparking a long and bloody Algerian Civil War. Today, Algeria is only still just emerging from decades of violence.

In January 1992, the military invited back to become chairman of the High Council of State of Algeria (a figurehead body for the military junta) the long exiled head of the Parti de la Révolution Socialiste, Muhammad Boudiaf (aka Si Tayeb el Watani). The day after this coup d'etat, attacks against police officers and soldiers began. Government repression was brutal. Arrests, round ups, and mass searches were carried out against ordinary citizens suspected of complicity with the "terrorists", for which there was no proper evidence. The authorities used special units of the gendarmerie to stop, torture, liquidate or send to internment camps in the south thousands of young militants or FIS sympathisers who had played no part in the armed struggle. Many were tried and condemned to death by military tribunal, in direct violation of the principles of human rights.

In April 1992, Boudiaf appointed a 60-man Consultative Council and attempted to create a new political movement, the Assemble Patriotique. He also initiated a drive against the corruption of the old Algerian regime. But Boudiaf was completely dependent on the forces that had brought him to power. His powers were circumscribed by the military and security establishment. Their primary interest was 'protecting' their hold on the country.

By June 1992 Boudiaf was dead, assassinated by a bodyguard during his first visit outside Algiers as head of state. As this visit was a televised public speech at the opening of a cultural center in Annaba, the assassination caused intense shock in Algeria. The assassin, Lt. Lembarek Boumaârafi, was said to have acted as a "lone gunman." However, he was also said to have acted due to his "Islamist sympathies." Others say he was an instrument of the military and security establishment.

During his brief regime, Boudiaf had banned the FIS and thousands of its members had been arrested. Islamist guerrillas rapidly emerged. They formed themselves into several armed groups, principally Le mouvement islamique armé (MIA), based in the mountains. But based in the towns, the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), or al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha, also emerged. Mansour Meliani, with many "Afghans", had broken with his former friend Abdelkader Chebouti and left the MIA to form the GIA.

A deadly decade

More than 160,000 people were killed in the decade between January 1992 and June 2002. Most of the dead were guerrillas and government troops, but a great number of civilians were also killed. The guerrilla movements had initially targeted the army and police, but some groups had started attacking civilians soon after the conflict commenced.

Between 1992 and 1998, the GIA is said to have conducted a violent campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation. It is claimed that from its inception on, the GIA called for and implemented the killing of anyone collaborating with or supporting the authorities, including government employees such as teachers and civil servants.

Almost 10 years later a former lieutenant in the Algerian army, Habib Souaidia, claimed that in the 1990s the Algerian army frequently massacred Algerian civilians and then blamed Islamic militants, particularly the GIA. In a 2002 hearing by a French court of a libel suit against Souaidia, a former colonel, Mohammed Samraoui, testified that "the Algerian army used all means to attack the Islamic rebellion: blackmail, corruption, threats, killings … we used terrorist methods to attack terrorism even before it had appeared." Indeed, Mohammed Samraoui, who had been the Algerian army’s deputy chief counter-intelligence specialist, testified that in the months before the Algerian army coup in January 1992, the Algerian army "created the GIA" in an attempt to weaken and destroy the FIS, which has been poised to take power in the cancelled elections.

What is certain is that as the GIA, hostile to FIS as well as to the government, rose to the forefront, FIS-loyalist guerrilla groups, threatened with marginalisation, attempted to unite their forces. In July 1994, the MIA, together with the remainder of the MEI and a variety of smaller groups, united as the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS). By 1995, the GIA had turned on the AIS in earnest. Reports of battles between the AIS and GIA increased (resulting in an estimated 60 deaths in March 1995 alone).

The GIA, claiming to be the "sole prosecutor of jihad" and angered by coordination between the other groups to attempt negotiation with the Algerian government, such as the Sant'Egidio Platform (sometimes also known as the Rome Platform or the Rome Accords), reiterated death threats against FIS and AIS leaders. In July 1995, the GIA assassinated a co-founder of FIS, Abdelbaki Sahraoui. A year later, the GIA leader, Djamel Zitouni, was killed by a breakaway ex-GIA faction. Zitouni was succeeded by Antar Zouabri (aka Abou Talha Antar or Abou Talha), who would prove an even bloodier leader.

Starting around April 1997 with the Thalit massacre, Algeria was wracked by massacres of intense brutality and unprecedented size. At this stage, the GIA had apparently adopted a takfirist ideology, believing that practically all Algerians not actively fighting the government were corrupt to the point of being kafirs. The GIA believed the kafirs could be killed righteously with impunity; an unconfirmed communiqué by Zouabri had stated that "except for those who are with us, all others are apostates and deserving of death."

Typically targeting entire villages or neighborhoods, GIA guerrillas killed tens, and sometimes hundreds, of civilians at a time. The AIS, faced with attacks from both the government and the GIA, and wanting to dissociate itself from the GIA's civilian massacres, declared a unilateral ceasefire in September 1997. Madani Mezrag, ordered a unilateral and unconditional ceasefire starting 1 October 1997, in order to "unveil the enemy that hides behind these abominable massacres."

The massacres continued through the end of 1998. In that year, Hassan Hattab, a GIA regional commander reportedly against the slaughter of civilians, split off from the GIA to form the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). By 1999 the AIS had been disbanded, but the GSPC was becoming an organisation that also targeted civilians.

In April 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected President with 74% of the votes, according to the official count. All other candidates had withdrawn from the election immediately prior to the vote, citing fraud concerns. French figures (published in Le Monde) gave Bouteflika only 28% in an election with 23% turn-out. In his memoirs, General Jaled Nezzar comments that Bouteflika was able to become President thanks to strong support from part of the military hierarchy which, after forcing the resignation of General Liamin Zerual, decided to withdraw the army from the forefront of the political scene and bring Bouteflika back. It is said that in 1994 Bouteflika refused the Army’s proposal to succeed the assassinated president, Mohamed Boudiaf. Bouteflika has claimed that this was because the army would not grant him full control over the armed forces.

Reconciliation?

After a decade of rhetoric focused on eradicating Islamism, Bouteflika made national reconciliation the leit motif of his program. Just five months after Bouteflika took office, he won overwhelming endorsement for a reconciliation plan that granted amnesty to thousands of Islamists. He was seeking through that plan to promote an image of himself as a legitimate president and peacemaker.

In early 2000 Bouteflika announced a major reshuffle of the Algerian military, sacking nine senior army officers and moving seven others to different posts. However, the military's most senior officers, the powerful army chief-of-staff Lieutenant Mohammed Lamari and the heads of military intelligence and counter-intelligence remained in their posts. Despite Bouteflika's peace-making, the "civil war" in Algeria continued, but with a lower intensity. There were 1,000 deaths during the five first months of 2000. The GIA, although isolated, continued to operate. Later that year Israeli officials claimed that their government was providing technical and military expertise to help Algeria build a counter-terrorism unit.

In February 2001, Habib Souaïdia, a young former officer of an elite unit of the Algerian army, published his memoir, La Sale Guerre (The Dirty War). Written as a result of a determination to describe the reality of the violence that had raged in Algeria since the cancellation of the 1992 elections, La Sale Guerre describes an escalating cycle of violence and brutality in which, Souaïdia said, both the outlawed armed Islamist groups and the army itself are implicated.

"I've seen fellow officers burn alive a 15-year-old child. I've seen soldiers dressed as terrorists massacring civilians. I've seen colonels kill ordinary suspects in cold blood. I've seen officers torture Islamists to death. I've seen too many things....and these are sufficient reasons, I am convinced, to break the wall of silence."


Then in the first half of April 2001, a young Kabyle activist named Guermah Massinissa was arrested and died in custody. Bouteflika's government claimed that the real name of Massinissa was in fact Karim and that he was a jobless criminal. This brought on what would become known as the Tafsut taberkant (Black Spring) after his death sparked violent clashes between young Kabyles and security forces in several villages. By the end of the month, more than 60 protesters had been killed and more than 600 wounded. Bouteflika announced that a commission would be established to investigate the events, but the protests continued.

In early May there were quiet demonstrations arranged by the Arouch movement in Algiers drawing between 10,000 and 30,000 people. By late May the demonstrations in Algiers drew around 300,000 people, though the organisers, the Front des Forces socialistes (FFS), claim that twice that number had participated. Bouteflika's government maintained that the Kabyles were "manipulated by a foreign hand." Bouteflika banned all demonstrations in Algiers.

The 2001 Kabyle riots were not just about what the gendarmerie had done to Guermah Massinissa, nor were they, as some media tried to portray them, about Berber calls for official recognition of their language, even if that was one of many themes of the demonstrations. The anger of Kabyle youth was essentially targeted at the entire military-backed Bouteflika regime, which they perceived as repressive and oblivious to their interests. The sense that the gendarmes could kill and pillage with impunity was one of the grievances fueling the protests. Demonstrators chanted familiar slogans of "pouvoir assassin" and "gouvernement terroriste, corrompu" -- the authorities are assassins, terrorists and corrupt. The rioters also called for an end to hogra, an Algerian expression which means being excluded and held in contempt and refers to the attitude of the ruling elite towards the majority of Algerians, who find themselves deprived of the wherewithal for a dignified life, and whose destiny lies in the hands of the secretive clique of military officers controlling the country. In December 2002, the Assistant U.S. Secretary of State, William Burns said that Washington "has much to learn from Algeria on ways to fight terrorism."

Like many other leaders, Bouteflika immediately offered Alergia’s support in the U.S. "war on terror" after 11 September 2001. He hoped that the US would see Algeria’s struggle against Islamic militants as comparable to the war against al-qāʿidah. On 23 September, 2001, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush included the GSPC on a list of organisations that "commit, threaten to commit or support terrorism." Bush would receive Bouteflika in the Oval Office twice within four months. The "war on terror" wasn't to be the only thing Bush and Bouteflika discussed, as by that time U.S. oil companies had invested more than three billion dollars in Algerian oil.

Bouteflika's government launched a major diplomatic offensive early in 2003 to obtain financial and military support from Washington. At about the same time stories emerged of attacks by a group led by Amari Saifi, alias Abderrazak "El Para", a former Algerian special forces officer who was said to have gone over to the GSPC. The day before a high-level United States military delegation arrived in Algiers to discuss the resumption of arms sales to Algeria as part of the "fight against terrorism", the group said to be led by El Bara allegedly attacked a military convoy near Batna, killing 43 soldiers. On the basis of a video recording which was subsequently revealed as a forgery, the Algerian army’s secret service, the DRS, tried to persuade public opinion that El Bara was a lieutenant of Usāmah bin Muhammad bin `Awaḍ bin Lādin in charge of establishing al-qāʿidah in the Sahel region. Shortly after, the United States eased its arms embargo on Algeria and announced the sale of anti-terrorist equipment to it.

It is also alleged that between 22 February and 24 March 2003 the El Bara led "faction" (allegedly a group from within the GSPC) kidnapped 32 European tourists. The "faction" allegedly did this in order to collect ransom for the release of their hostages, but in fact while the tourists were held hostage, their mysterious kidnappers issued no communique claiming responsibility, and made no financial or political demands. The GSPC itself certainly never claimed responsibility for kidnapping the tourists. Indeed, one of the hostages openly doubted the official version of how they had been "rescued" in May 2003:
"The Salafists were well aware of what was about to happen. They marched us 20km through the desert to a predetermined location, a geographically suitable venue for our ‘liberation’. It occurred to me much later that the whole thing might have been staged by the Algerian military ... I still wonder whether there are links between the Salafists and the army."

Then in September 2003, it was reported that Hattab had been deposed as national emir of the GSPC. It was reported that he was replaced by Nabil Sahraoui (aka Sheikh Abou Ibrahim Mustapha), a 39 year-old former GIA commander. Sahraoui was subsequently reported to have pledged the GSPC's allegiance to al-qāʿidah, the international Sunni-Salafiyya Islamic movement founded in 1988 and subsequently designated a terrorist organisation by the United Nations Security Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the European Union, and the governments of the United States, Australia, Canada, India, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

In March 2004, General Charles Wald, deputy commander of the U.S. European Command (Eucom), claimed that members of al-qāʿidah were trying to establish themselves in the northern part of Africa, in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He said, "They are looking for sanctuary as they did in Afghanistan when the Taliban were in power. They need a stable place in which to equip themselves, organise and recruit new members."

Abdelaziz Bouteflika was re-elected president of the Republic of Algeria in the first round of presidential elections held in April 2004. His victory was widely seen as a confirmation of Bouteflika's strengthened control over the state apparatus. Nevertheless, President George W Bush congratulated him. By October, the U.S. Department of Defense had established the Magharebia web site which is openly stated is "designed to provide an international audience with a portal to a broad range of information about the Maghreb region." That web site is now maintained by U.S. Africa Command (Africom).

During the first year of his second term, Bouteflika commenced promoting a referendum on his Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which put at the President's discretion implementation of measures such as indemnities to victims of terrorism and their families, compensation for material damages, the future of rural militias raised by the military, the possible reintegration of those dismissed from work on political grounds, and the extent to which insurgent leaders who escaped abroad would be pardoned. In 2005 the Charter passed with 97% support and was implemented as law on 28 February 28 2006.

At about that time in early 2006 steep petroleum price rises sparked violent protests throughout the country and throughout the year demonstrations, strikes and violent protests erupted over a range of social, economic and political problems, including water, job and housing shortages, public mismanagement and corruption. There were allegations that individuals arrested after protests were tortured or ill-treated in custody. More than 400 people were killed as a result of continuing violence, including dozens of civilians.

Throughout 2006 attacks by armed groups on military targets, and to a lesser extent, civilians, continued to be reported. For example, in December 2006 it was reported that the GSPC attacked a bus transporting employees of the Brown & Root - Condor Corporation, which is linked to the U.S. construction firm Halliburton. Throughout the year dozens of people suspected of being members of armed groups were killed by the security forces and there were concerns that some of these killings may have been extrajudicial executions.

In 2007, the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat allegedly formally affiliated with al-qāʿidah. In the mainstream media worldwide the group was henceforth referred to as "al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM). A prominent role in reinforcing this revised way of referring to the group was played by organisations such as the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) and The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI), founded in 1985 by Martin Indyk, a research director for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) who would later be appointed U.S. Ambassador to Israel. Whilst AQIM has been listed as a terrorist organisation by the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom still list the group as the GSPC.

At the outset of this year the Algerian Ministry of Defense awarded Italian-based Selex Sistemi Integrati a contract worth 230 million euros (US$338 million), part of the so-called Runitel program, to build and deploy within 30 months a comprehensive Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) system in the troubled southern regions of the country. Last month, Bloomberg's Daniel Williams reported that "bands of Islamist fighters, terrorist trainers and arms suppliers roaming the mountainous southern Sahara Desert are new targets in the U.S. war against al-Qaeda."

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Åland

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About 10,000 years ago, the highest parts of an archipelago emerged from the brackish Baltic Sea. This archipelago now includes some six and a half thousand islands and skerries and is known as the Åland Islands. This place has an interesting story, and one we should examine more closely because this place, home today to a population of about 26,200 people, has a "special status" under international law.

That's what Kofi Annan would have had in mind when, as United Nations Secretary-General, he said in 2006 that the international community’s ability to avert a war between Finland and Sweden over the Åland islands stands as a useful example of conflict resolution that should inspire approaches to current situations.

The geographical location of the archipelago, straddled as it is between Sweden and Finland at a point that could dominate the Baltic Sea, has long had the potential to cause a crisis. In 1921, following what has been dubbed "the Åland crisis," it was made an autonomous, Swedish-speaking, and importantly, demilitarised, administrative province of Finland as a result of a decision made by the League of Nations. It was one of the Leagues first international arbitration decisions.

The people of Åland have long spoken Swedish and had a culture similar to that seen in Sweden. Indeed, Åland was made part of the Swedish kingdom in the 13th century.

In 1714, Åland was devastated by the Russians during "the Great Wrath" and the majority of the population fled to Sweden. Nearly a decade later the inhabitants finally returned to Åland, only to have their islands occupied by Russians again twenty years later during "the Lesser Wrath."

In 1808, as part of their Finnish War campaign, the Russians invaded Åland. An Ålandic uprising put the Russian forces out of action for a time, but in 1809 Åland was conquered by the Russians. Åland became part of the Grand Duchy of Finland as a part of the Russian Empire when Sweden was forced to give up all control of the eastern third of its territory, including the islands, to Imperial Russia.

In 1832, the Bomarsunds fästning (Bomarsund fortress) was built by the Russians on the Åland island of Sund.

It was destroyed twenty two years later during the Crimean War by a British-French fleet and as an outcome of the Treaty of Paris, Britain required Russia to withhold the construction of any new fortifications on the islands. Åland was to be demilitarised.

Yet by the First World War in 1914, the Russian government turned the islands into a submarine base for the use of British and Russian submarines during the war. In 1915, Russian troops were moved to Åland and coastal batteries and field fortifications were built.

Then in December 1917, fearing the effects of the Russian October Revolution, the Finnish parliament called on the principles of national self-determination and proclaimed that Finland was a sovereign state. Ålanders had organised for their own self-determination that winter, fearing what they saw as excessive expressions of "pro-Finnishness" and "anti-Swedishness" in Finland.

Representatives of Åland’s municipalities held a secret meeting at the Åland Folk High School, where they decided to seek reunification with their Swedish motherland. A delegation presented this request, which was backed by a mass petition signed by an overwhelming majority of the local adult population, to the Swedish King and Government.

Finland was not prepared to meet the Ålanders’ demands, and instead offered a form of internal self-government. The Finnish Parliament adopted a law regulating the proposed autonomy, but the Ålandic representatives rejected it.

And so, on the initiative of England in 1920, the Åland Islands Question was referred to the newly formed League of Nations. In June 1921, the League’s Council presented a compromise decision which offered something to each of the three parties to the conflict, Finland, Sweden and Åland. Finland was granted sovereignty over Åland, but was placed under an obligation to guarantee to the population of the Islands their Swedish culture, language, local customs and the system of self-government that Finland had offered Åland in 1920.

The decision was supplemented with an agreement between Finland and Sweden on how the guarantees were to be realised and, most importantly, the League also decided that a treaty governing Åland’s demilitarisation and neutralisation should be drawn up to ensure that the Islands would never become a military asset used to threaten Sweden.

Indeed, thanks to a quirk of early 20th-century history, Ålanders are effectively sovereign co-rulers of Finland. As such, they can veto Finnish foreign policy and ensure "friendly relations" with Sweden that way.

Just this past week there's been a prime example of those "friendly relations" with Crown Princess Victoria, heir to the Swedish throne, arriving in the Åland capital, Mariehamn, to make what is the first official visit from a member of the Swedish royal family since Åland received its autonomy in 1921.

[More to come ...]

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Albania

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"We spent the 1990s worrying about a Greater Serbia. That's finished. We are going to spend time well into the next century worrying about a Greater Albania," said Christopher R. Hill, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Macedonia at the close of the last century.

Why did he say this? Why did he think "we" will be "worrying about a Greater Albania" now and for years to come?

I focus on Hill's perspective, and question his core assumption, as we begin to look into the situation in Albania because this notion of a "Greater Albania" appears to be a key to the different perspectives on the country comprising an area of 28,750 square kilometres, which we in the West call Albania (i.e the Medieval Latin name that we apply to a land that the local people have since the 16th century called Shqipëria, "Land of the Eagles.")

The notion that the Shqiptarët (aka the Albanians), wherever they may be, regard their domicile as part of a "Greater Albania" and will undertake all efforts necessary to secure such an outcome is obviously something of concern to non-Albanians in this part of the world. There are those who claim that "unification of all territories where Albanians live in the Balkans has been and will remain the most serious threat to regional stability and European integration."

The fact is that a century of shifting borders has indeed left Shqiptarët scattered across Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece; but how real is the prospect of a "Greater Albania"? How real is the "threat" of a "Greater Albania"? Could it be mere myth, used by politicians of the Balkans for their own purposes; to fuel fears; to drum up support; and to drive wedges between people who could live peacefully together?

To arrive at answers reflecting the truth of the situation involves sifting through great volumes of biased material; some of it blantant propaganda, some of it more subtle. Arriving at answers will take much time and it is necessary to also develop an understanding of the situations in Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece. So keep an eye on comments to this post and the posts on those other places, for the true story of the situation in this part of the world is complex and something we'll need to keep returning to and updating.

[More to come ...]

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Akrotiri and Dhekelia

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Another land, like Abkhazia, that doesn't come to mind (for most in the West) very often, if at all? Know where it is?

Here's a clue:

It has been described as "a jolly, sunny place beside the sea, with private beaches, brandy sours and sweet-smelling, tree-lined avenues named after battles, generals or air marshals."

Know where it is now?

No?

The flag of the United Kingdom flies over it, for this Middle England transplanted in the eastern Mediterranean is ....

... a British military enclave covering 3% of the land area of the island of Cyprus. That's almost 254 square kilometres of south-central Cyprus.





This land was retained as a “Sovereign Base Area” by the UK under the London Agreement of 1959 granting the independence of Cyprus. It was part of the price of the UK quiting its colonial rule of Cyprus and it provides the British with port and airfield facilities but also - and perhaps more importantly nowadays - the perfect electronic listening post to monitor signals of every kind from the Middle East, North Africa and the Balkans.

Indeed it said to be home to a listening station capturing telephone calls, faxes and e-mails around the world. It may be a key part of ECHELON, the largest electronic spy network in history, run by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

More than 3,500 British military personnel are located there; their families and civilian staff bring the British population to around 8,000. British servicemen and women and their families covet the posting there. Apparently the western sovereign base area of Akrotiri is the biggest RAF facility outside Britain and its nicknamed the "kebab posting" by airmen.

Then there are the people who used to call this land their own. To gain some insight into their situation read this recent news:


Nine British soldiers charged after bar brawl in Cyprus
by Audrey Gillan
The Guardian, Monday February 4 2008

Nine British soldiers have been charged following a bar brawl in the Cyprus town of Ayia Napa on Friday. The men had been celebrating what is known as "millionaire's weekend" - they had received their last pay packet before their tour of duty on the island was due to come to an end next month.

... According to CyBC state radio, police said that at least 20 British soldiers, all serving at the Dhekelia base in Cyprus, attacked the owner of the pub and five of his customers. Kyriacos Hadjiyiannis, the owner of the Bedrock Inn, told the island's Sunday Mail newspaper: "A friend of mine suffered a broken nose after he was hit with a pair of crutches. He also had to spend three hours in hospital to have 22 stitches to his face."

... Last year two British marines returning from Afghanistan were charged with assaulting a taxi driver after breaking curfew for a night out in Limassol during a Cyprus stopover.

Soldiers are banned from certain areas of Ayia Napa, particularly the bars clustered around the town's square - notorious for debauched behaviour by tourists.

There have been several cases involving soldiers serving on the island, the worst of which was the rape and murder of Danish tour guide Louise Jensen in 1994.



Now tell me, do you think they're pleased to share their "sunny place beside the sea" with the people who call it "the kebab posting"?

In July 2001, violent protests were held at the bases by local Cypriots, angry at British plans to construct radio masts at the bases, as part of an upgrade of British military communication posts around the world. Locals had claimed the masts would endanger local lives and cause cancer, as well as have a negative impact on wildlife in the area.

The British government denied these claims.

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Afghanistan

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This morning I type "Afghanistan" into a Google News search and I select the story appearing at the top of the list (as sorted by relevance). It is an article published by The Associated Press:

Militants die in Afghanistan clash
By AMIR SHAH – 3 hours ago

KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — Dozens of protesters blocked a road Saturday in eastern Afghanistan, claiming U.S.-led coalition forces killed three civilians, and a local official said police fatally shot one of the protesters and injured three of them.

Villagers from the area carried three bodies to a major highway during the protest. Police allegedly opened fire, killing one and wounding three.

The coalition said its troops were attacked Friday while searching compounds in the Shinwar district of Nangarhar province.

"Several militants were killed" and nine insurgents were arrested, the coalition said in a statement Saturday.


With our ends in mind, i.e. to determine the truth about where we are, this report raises several questions: Who are the 'militants' and who are the 'protestors'? Who are the 'U.S.-led coalition forces' and why are they in this land? Is this reported 'clash' an event that's somewhat representative of the current experience of the human condition by people in this place we call Afghanistan?

The answers to any of these questions can serve as a starting point in beginning to understand what it is to be "here" in Afghanistan. So let's take the first question and see where that leads: Who are the 'militants' and who are the 'protestors' described in that report?

The people living in the land known today as Afghanistan are ethnically and linguistically mixed, reflecting the location of their homelands on historic travel routes leading from Central Asia into South Asia and Southwest Asia.

The 'land of the Afghans' is actually the land of families of Pashtuns, Takjiks, Hazaras, Farsiwan, Qezelbash, Uzbeks, Aimak, Turkmen, Baluch, Nuristani and other smaller ethnic groups. Excluding urban populations in the principal cities, most of the people of non-urban Afghanistan are divided into tribal and other kinship-based groups, which follow traditional customs and religious practices.

There's a clue to the identity of the reported 'protestors' in the location -- Shinwar -- in Nangarhar, one of the thirty-four provinces of Afghanistan. It is a location where the local people are predominantly Pashtun.

The Pashtun, a population of approximately 42 million in toto (13 million within Afghanistan and 29 million beyond its borders), are an Eastern Iranian ethno-linguistic group. These people inhabit primarily eastern and southern Afghanistan, the North-West Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan provinces of neighbouring western Pakistan.

The Pashtun tend to be referred to as 'Afghans' (despite there being far more Pashtun living today in Pakistan than in Afghanistan), while other groups hold to their ethnic name. Herein lies a clue to the human condition as lived in the land of the Afghans. Indeed, it is something that characterises not only the human condition as lived in this land, but that lived in many lands. Individuals, families, clans, tribes; they draw on various identities. Could identity be at the core of clashing that characterises the human condition as experienced in this 'land of the Afghans'?

From its founding in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, Afghanistan had traditionally been dominated by the Pashtuns, who before 1978 constituted a 51% minority in the country. However, about 85% of the 6.2 million Afghan refugees who fled the war that broke out here in 1979 were Pashtuns. This, accordingly, lowered the percentage of Pashtuns inside Afghanistan temporarily and raised the percentages of the country's other ethnic groups (fuelling some tension in the land). By the mid-1990s many of the refugees returned restoring the Pashtuns to their status of the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan constituting about 45% of the population (and increasing the tension).

The 'Afghans' are a proud people. The true essence of their culture can be seen in the "code of ethics" that they live by - the unwritten Pushtunwali (the way of the Pushtan). Pushtunwali is followed religiously, and it includes the following practices: melmastia (hospitality and protection to every guest); nanawati (the right of a fugitive to seek refuge, and acceptance of his bona fide offer of peace); badal (the right of blood feuds or revenge); tureh (bravery); sabat (steadfastness); imamdari (righteousness); 'isteqamat (persistence); ghayrat (defense of property and honour); and mamus (defense of women).

The 'Afghans' are a people divided. They have divided themselves into tribal and sub-tribal groups to which they remain intensely loyal. These tribal divisions have been the source of conflict among Pashtuns throughout their history. Even today, the Pashtun parties are divided along tribal lines. The Pushtan tribes of Afghanistan are said to love or hate with equal intensity. They display fierce loyalty to friends, whilst exercising the right of badal - revenge or blood feuds - as far as enemies are concerned. An old proverb reveals much, "He is no Pushtan who does not give a blow for a punch."

And the 'Afghans' are a people in pain. It is the Pashtuns who have been the main victims of U.S.-NATO bombing attacks on the Taliban, who are largely Pashtuns and operate almost entirely in Pashtun territory. In one authoritative estimate, Pashtun civilian casualties have numbered nearly 5,000 since 2001.

Many Pashtun are seen as 'militant' by the Westerners fighting in the "Afghanistan theatre" of the "Global War on Terror." The Taleban Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (TIMA), which formed in in September of 1994 "to rid Afghanistan of criminals," -- whether you believe the story that the 'criminals' referred to were those responsible for the rape and murder of boys and girls from a family traveling to Kandahar, or that the 'criminals' were the bandits harassing the "Afghanistan Transit Trade," -- comprised mostly Pashtuns from Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan. The term 'Taleban', is so often now used by politicians and the press in the West as a synonym for the 'militant' and 'insurgent' forces of Afghanistan, it is easy to see how in the eye of the one-eyed, the Pashtun 'protestors' may seem to merge with 'militants' and 'insurgents.'

Certainly that was borne out by what occurred in March of 2007, in the Shinwar district of Nangarhar (i.e. that place where 'protestors' gathered last week). What occurred was the Shinwar massacre. According to witnesses and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, U.S. Marines responded to an attack by with excessive force, firing indiscriminately at civilians passing by on the busy highway 40kms to the east of , killing elderly men, women, and children. Akhtyar Gul, a local reporter who witnessed the shooting, claims that, even though they were not under attack, the Marines sprayed civilians with machine gun fire. The Marines murdered 19 people and wounded over 30 more.

Now, a little over a year later, these people have been dealt another blow. A less bloody blow perhaps than that dealt to them before by those U.S. Marines, but a blow nevertheless with potentially very bloody consequences. For the shooting this time was carried out by Afghan National Police (trained and supplied by U.S. Marines).

Whether the people are "militants," or "insurgents," or merely civilian "protestors," watch out for the blowback (again).

Orana gelar

News Archive for Afghanistan
Wikimedia Atlas of Afghanistan
Amnesty International: Human Rights in Afghanistan
HDI: 0.345 (Rank 2007: 174)
Literacy rate: less than 30%


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Abkhazia

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It may be a surprise to find that first in our list of countries to survey is Abkhazia.

Where?

Abkhazia!?

Yes, Abkhazia!

Abkhazia has a president, a flag, a national anthem and even a visa system for foreign visitors, but the country doesn't appear on many maps.

Abkhazia is the land located in the Transcaucasus region between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. It is a land that was incorporated into Russia in 1810; was declared an Independent Soviet Socialist Republic in March 1921; by December 1921 had signed a treaty of federation with Georgia(which we shall visit later); and was merged into Georgia as an autonomous republic of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1931.

It sounds an idyllic land. Squeezed between the Black Sea and the Caucasus mountains the climate in Abkhazia is mild. The coastal areas have a subtropical climate and it had been known as the "Soviet Riviera" in the 1970s and 1980s. To this day, tourism is said to a key industry.

It is a fertile land. It is a land richly irrigated by small rivers originating in the Caucasus mountains. Its agriculture supplied Soviet markets with tea, tobacco, wine and fruits (especially tangerines) and, it is said, these agricultural products remain an important part of the economy of this country.

But in truth, Abkhazia today is a half-abandoned place of rusting ports and skeleton homes. It is a vast junkyard of collapsed structures and resurgent nature. The factories are blighted, offices shut down.

Roads are dotted with the shells of homes, picked clean of all but the frame. Staircases to nowhere rise from tangles of vine. Cows claim the right of way on shattered roads, stepping among the bomb craters and puddles.

The economy is broken, but the people don't starve. Families have turned to their gardens to survive; to their milk cows and chickens; their fruit and nut trees.

It is called a "ghost country" because no other country has officially recognised it. Only Abkhas recognise their sovereignity over their land.

It is said that there are about 200,000 ethnic Abkhaz in all, of whom 150,000 live in Abkhazia. These people are a Caucasian ethnic group, and their origin is not clear. Classical sources speak of several tribes dwelling in the region, but their exact identity and location remains controversial. The Abasgoi of the Graeco-Roman authors are sometimes considered as the predecessors of modern-day Abkhaz, but the identification is not universally accepted.

Once part of the ancient Greek and Roman empires, many Abkhaz adopted Christianity in the sixth century. Surveys of Abkhazia's population (1997 and 2003) shows the Abkhaz people are highly religious. In 2003, 60% of the people surveyed considered themselves Orthodox Christians, 16% Muslims, 8% atheists and unbelievers, 5% pagans, 3% devotees of an Abkhaz religion. Jehovah's Witnesses and Jews accounted for less than 1% each. It would seem to be a population not riven by tensions based on religious identification.

Yet this land is rift. People inhabiting this place are not at peace with each other. Conflict between peoples over this land is primarily a consequence of conflicting views and of longstanding fears with regard to the preservation of language, culture and national identity.

The French historian Papin described in 1824 the "state of perpetual hostility" in which the Abkhaz were living "with their neighbours the Russians from Doudjouk-Kal and the Mingrelians". Events such as the Caucasian war, which ended in 1864, the deportation of a large part of the Abkhaz population by the Tsarist regime in the wake of the failed uprisings of 1866 and 1877, the Georgian colonization of the country and the establishment of Soviet rule, are grievances still held by Abkhaz today. The Abkhaz feel their culture is on the verge of extinction.

The Abkhaz feared that the "Georgianization" of Abkhazia,
which in their view was far advanced under the Soviet regime
and their view is supported by the chart to the left which was published by Conciliation Resources).

They feared this "Georgianization" would be completed through the integration of Abkhazia into a Georgian framework. They were concerned that a rise in the number of Georgians through further ‘colonisation’ would lead to the exclusion of the Abkhaz from political power in their own homeland and limit their rights.

The Georgians feared the Russification of Abkhazia by cultural means and the loss of the ‘historical’ Georgian character of this region. They criticized the close links between the Abkhaz leadership and Moscow.

In the view of both parties, political sovereignty – which meant in practice full control of the state apparatus of Abkhazia – was the sole instrument to counter that fear of extinction.

Georgian language was made compulsory in Georgia and the Abkhazi felt their culture was being assimilated and dissipated. An existential crisis, real or merely perceived, is a motivating force. A secessionist movement of the Abkhaz people living in this region declared independence from Georgia in 1992, so it is now a de facto independent republic, but de jure an autonomous republic
covering 8,600 km² of land located within the internationally recognised borders of Georgia on the eastern coast of the Black Sea.

What can we see of the present situation in this land where the Abkhaz live?

Concern about conflict escalating into crisis and violence.

Conflict over this land has festered since the fighting in 1992-1993. Fourteen years of negotiation, led alternately by the UN and Russia, have done little to resolve it. Conflict remains a central factor in the experience of living in this land. The main topic of discussion in the region is whether war is going to break out again.

Years of stalemate have solidified each side’s distorted and negative image of the “other”.

Tensions rose in July 2006 when a forceful Georgian police operation raided a "renegade militia" out of upper Kodori Gorge, the one part of pre-war Abkhazia not controlled by the de facto government in Sukhumi.

Since then Georgian-Abkhaz negotiations have been frozen. While Georgia asserts that it is committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, its military budget rose in 2005 at a rate higher than any other country in the world. Bellicose statements by some officials do not increase confidence.

Georgia accuses the Abkhaz secessionists of having conducted a deliberate campaign of ethnic cleansing. This claim is supported by an OSCE declaration and many Western governments. The United Nations Security Council has diplomatically avoided use of the term "ethnic cleansing", but it has affirmed "the unacceptability of the demographic changes resulting from the conflict."

Local media are broadcasting statements from Moscow warning that if Georgia attacks Abkhazia, Russia will support its citizens there and tens of thousands of people in Abkhazia now hold Russian passports.

Last week a Georgian newspaper, Rezonansi, printed a front-page headline asking,'Will war in Abkhazia begin tomorrow?' The article said that Russian and Abkhaz forces were preparing to attack the Upper Kodori Valley, the only part of Abkhaz territory still under Georgian control.

It was reported last week that the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, speaking to Russian journalists, had said, "I think that a few days ago, we were very close [to war] and this threat is still real."

The rise in tension comes after Russia sent an additional 500 troops to Abkhazia to join the peacekeeping force there (which operates under a mandate from the Commonwealth of Independent States). It also comes after a number of serious incidents between Tbilisi and Moscow.

Moscow has withdrawn from CIS sanctions against Abkhazia and has authorised official contacts with the de facto government there. The Georgians have accused Moscow of behaving aggressively by deploying extra troops and shooting down a Georgian unmanned spy plane over Abkhazia on 20 April 2008.

The Georgians are saying they have no intention of declaring war, but Georgia holds parliamentary elections later this month. Can we see that the Georgian president might be grateful for this chance to be seen as bold?

The president of the unrecognised Abkhazia republic, Sergei Bagapsh, stated on Wednesday, 7 May 2008 (in an interview with the Spanish El Pais newspaper), that Abkhazia will eventually achieve independence just like Serbia's Kosovo gained sovereignty in February 2008.

"We want a lawful state, independent and democratic... If Kosovo can be independent then so can Abkhazia," Bagapsh said. "We [Abkhazia] do not want Moscow to recognise us in defiance of the United States in order to take revenge for Kosovo," he added, "We want independence because we have a right to it. Because we have deserved it."

[Much more to come ... as there is much, much more to learn]

orana gelar


News Archive for Abkhazia
Wikimedia Atlas of Abkhazia
HDI: N/A (Rank 2008: N/A)


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Though this be madness, yet there is method in't.

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As stated in my first post on this new blog, my intent is to set out on a journey of sorts and together we can walk about our world (virtually travelling via the world wide web); we can talk about what we see; and we can explore together the story of our present human condition through our conversations.

The human condition encompasses all of the experience of being human, so to survey the present situation of human populations around our planet is an enormous endeavour. There is much territory to traverse.

We have divided our world. We have divided it in many ways. We have, for example, divided up the lands on which we live into many countries.

Our method will be to work through the "official list of countries" (in alphabetical order) and note some of the facts from which we might gain some insight into the situation as lived by the people in these places.

The list of such countries we will visit includes territories that are independent states (both those that are internationally recognised and generally unrecognised), inhabited dependent territories, and areas of special sovereignty. Within these many places are families identifying with various tribal, clan ethnicities.

The duration of this journey will be long. There is so much to see and so much more to say about what we witness. It may seem madness to take it on, considering the huge size of such a task, but I find much enjoyment in such an exercise.

Enjoyment? Yes, as it is an educative exercise, one in which I feel certain a great deal of learning will be accomplished, I find it most enjoyable.

I am not naïve, however, and I realise going into this that some of what I will learn and then share here will be worrying, sometimes shocking, often a cause of sadness; for many of our brothers and sisters in this world live in situations that are not safe, many are oppressed, many endure great suffering.

Though all is not doom and gloom on this earth, and I hope to share information that may surprise in a positive way, to reveal what is good about the human condition as lived in some communities and to show what is worthy of celebration and emulation.

And so I set off on this expedition. It will be a long and often arduous effort to explore where we are. I hope you will join me. Walk with me a while and we'll speak the truth about what we see.

orana gelar


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Gather round people, I'll tell you a story ...

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Where to begin with the first post on a new blog?

When looking for inspiration I sometimes start by checking what others whom have gone before me have seen and said in such a way that their views and their insights are kept alive in our culture.

On this occasion, the beginning of this new blog, I looked at what others have said about beginnings and I saw this pearl of wisdom:

“The first step towards getting somewhere is to decide that you are not going to stay where you are.”

And, the first thought I had on seeing that was: Where are we?

Think about it. We must know where we are if we are to decide we are not going to stay where we are.

To know where we are need not entail some exhausting exercise to determine a precise location, but surely we do need to have some sense of what it is like to be "here" in order to decide we are not going to stay "here" and then take those steps to get somewhere else.

So I start this simple blog as an opportunity to explore this very simple question: Where are we?

I invite you to join me and see how it is that from little things big things grow. Together we can walk about our world, talk about what we see and explore the story of our present human condition through our conversations. Together we can try to get to something closer to truth.

Glaginye! [Welcome!]
orana gelar


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